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The Limits of Minimal Diversity
C. DOUGLAS FLOYD*
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of overlapping mass tort and other complex litiga-
tion arising from the same or a related series of transactions and occur-
rences has imposed significant burdens on both federal and state courts,
and led to urgent calls for reform.' Commencing in the late 197os, re-
peated bills were introduced in Congress providing for the maintenance
in federal court of any civil action comprising multiple claims arising
from the same transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct (or, in later
versions, accident), provided that "minimal diversity" of citizenship ex-
isted between any two adverse parties in the action and certain other re-
quirements were met. These proposals culminated in the passage of the
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002.2 This expansion of
federal jurisdiction is predicated on the assumption that the "complete
diversity" rule articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his early opinion
in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,3 which requires that each party in the action be
of diverse citizenship from every adverse party, is only a statutory rather
than a constitutional limitation that can be altered at will by Congress.
The Multiparty, Multiforum Act also allows the removal from state court
for potential consolidation with a pending federal action meeting the
Act's requirements of state court actions that arise from the same acci-
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. I wish to thank my colleagues, Thomas R. Lee
and James R. Rasband, for their helpful comments, and my research assistants, Margaret Robertson,
Christopher Childs, and Jessica Woodbury.
I. See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 3406 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, IOlst Cong. 52 (1989) (statement of Robert F. Hanley, ABA Mass Torts Commission); REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990); ABA COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, REP. No. 126 TO
THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1989); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) [hereinafter ALI REPORT]; Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D.
Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 20 (1986).
But see REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON CIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
48-50 (1999) (cautioning against hasty reform and recommending further study).
2. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat.
1758, 1826 (2002).
3. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (18o6).
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dent, even if the removed state court actions involve no diversity of citi-
zenship at all.'
Similarly, in 1994 the ALI issued a report on complex litigation pro-
posing legislation permitting the consolidation for all purposes, including
trial, of dispersed litigation pending in federal court involving one or
more common questions of fact, as well as the removal from state court
of litigation arising out of the same "transaction or occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences" as a pending federal action, even though
none of the parties in the removed state court action was of diverse citi-
zenship from any other party.' The ALl grounded federal jurisdiction
over such removed actions primarily on the concept of "supplemental ju-
risdiction," but also invoked the concept of "minimal diversity" in sup-
port of its proposal. Again, the Institute proceeded on the assumption
that the complete diversity requirement was of statutory, rather than
constitutional, dimension.
Commencing in the mid-I99os and continuing to date, yet another
push for federal jurisdiction expansion based on the "minimal diversity"
concept surfaced in proposed federal class action jurisdiction legislation.
That legislation would authorize the removal from state to federal court
of any state court class action in which any member of the plaintiffs' class
is of diverse citizenship from any defendant, subject to certain restric-
tions.6
The primary purpose of the Multiparty, Multiforum Act and of the
ALI's proposal is to achieve judicial and litigant economy, as well as
fairness to litigants, by preventing repetitive litigation and inconsistent
outcomes resulting from multiple federal and state proceedings arising
out of the same transactions or events.7 The class action jurisdiction pro-
posal shares those objectives. However, it also is based on congressional
findings that state courts are not well equipped to resolve large-scale
class action litigation having interstate aspects, and that such state class
actions not only have resulted in settlements that are unfair to class
members, but have subjected business defendants to unfair settlement
8pressure.
This Article examines the origins and validity of the pivotal assump-
tion underlying these federal jurisdiction expansion enactments and pro-
posals. They rest on the view that the presence of "minimal diversity"
found somewhere in an aggregation of claims whose joinder is authorized
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part I.D.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 32-48, 67-68.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 82-94.
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by the rules that Congress or the rules drafters may adopt satisfies the
constitutional requirement for federal jurisdiction over the entire action.
Part I reviews the recent enactments and proposals and their supporting
rationales in more detail. Part II examines the U.S. Supreme Court's im-
portant interpleader decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tashire,9 in which the Court, for the first time, explicitly endorsed the
concept of "minimal diversity" in defining the constitutional scope of the
Diversity Clause of Article II.0 The Article concludes that Tashire does
not support the expansive applications of the minimal diversity thesis
underlying the more recent proposals for enlargement of federal jurisdic-
tion.
Part III advances three models under which the constitutional limits
of the Diversity Clause might be analyzed. Under the first, "delegation"
model of federal jurisdiction, the scope of the federal diversity "contro-
versy" would be defined by whatever rules of party and claim joinder
that Congress and the rules drafters might adopt, provided only that
some claim in the action falls within the scope of Article III, without fur-
ther analysis of whether the joinder of those claims serves the purposes
underlying the limited grants of federal judicial power. The second, "his-
toric" model of federal diversity jurisdiction would seek to support the
joinder in a federal action of non-diverse state law claims that otherwise
would fall outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts by asking whether
English courts of equity at the time the Constitution was adopted would
have regarded purely legal claims not otherwise satisfying the require-
ments of equity jurisdiction as part of a single equitable "case" because
of the inadequacy of the remedy at law. The third, "necessary and
proper" model of federal jurisdiction would support the joinder in a sin-
gle federal diversity action of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims
by asking whether the joinder of the non-diverse state law claims rea-
sonably might be thought to serve the purposes underlying Article III's
grant of federal jurisdiction over controversies between "Citizens of dif-
ferent States."" This Article concludes that only the third model satisfac-
torily defines the boundaries of Article III. Further, in view of the
importance of maintaining the balance between federal and state judicial
power embodied in Article III, such a necessary and proper analysis
should focus on real, rather than imagined, grounds for the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims, and should require
a discernable connection between the jurisdictional expansion at issue
9. 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
IO. U.S. CONST. art. III.
I I. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
February 2004]
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and the purposes underlying the Constitution's limited grants of judicial
power to the national government.
Part IV then evaluates the various federal jurisdiction expansion en-
actments and proposals under such a necessary and proper model and
concludes that, in many of their applications, they present significant is-
sues in terms both of congressional power to enact them, and the appro-
priateness of its doing so. This is particularly true of their expansive
removal provisions, which dispense with any requirement that any in-
tended beneficiary of the Diversity Clause seek to invoke federal juris-
diction, and, in some applications, dispense with any requirement that
the removed state court action involve any diversity of citizenship at all.
Finally, Part IV also considers whether the enacted and proposed
expansions of federal jurisdiction based on "minimal diversity" of citi-
zenship might instead be sustained on the ground that the federal courts
possess "supplemental" jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims
that arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as the diversity
claims with which they are joined. This Article concludes that this alter-
native foundation for federal jurisdiction expansion also is inadequate to
the extent that it relies on the formal presence of a "transactional rela-
tionship" among claims without inquiring whether joinder of the jurisdic-
tional and non-jurisdictional claims on the basis of such a relationship is
"necessary and proper" to achieve the purposes underlying Article III.
I. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MASS TORT AND
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM: DISECONOMIES AND UNFAIRNESS
ATTENDANT ON REPETITIVE AND OVERLAPPING FEDERAL AND STATE
LITIGATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER
In 1986, building on a previous Department of Justice proposal for
legislative action to address the problem of multiparty, multiforum litiga-
tion,'2 Rowe and Sibley published an influential article addressing what
they termed "the problem of scattered litigation."' 3 That work has pro-
vided an important foundation for subsequent proposals directed at the
same basic concern, both in its description of the problem to be ad-
dressed and in its proposed solution to that problem by making "minimal
12. See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform-z979: Hearings on H.R. io46
and H.R. 2202 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice, 96th Cong. 158-62 (979).
13. Rowe & Sibley, supra note I, at 20.
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diversity" the basis for federal jurisdiction over original and removed
proceedings designed to avoid duplicative federal/state litigation.
As Rowe and Sibley described it, "the problem is the unavailability
of any single forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation-
a difficulty that is becoming more and more common given the increas-
ing number of complex tort actions, such as those growing out of mass
accidents and product liability claims."' 4 Invoking Professor Chafee's
aphorism that "the benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit grow where
two grew before,"'" they argued that "[t]he goal of reducing multiple liti-
gation is itself hardly a controversial one," noting the economy of not
litigating the same matter twice, and the reduction of inconsistent out-
comes, whipsawing, and "uncoordinated scrambles for the assets of a lim-
ited fund" as benefits of such consolidated proceedings.'6 These concerns,
they argued, had taken on "heightened urgency" as the incidence of dis-
persed mass tort and other complex litigation had increased. 7 These ob-
servations have proved to be prescient of the current litigation landscape
in federal and state courts.
To resolve the problem, they proposed the enactment of a Multi-
party, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act. The essence of the proposal was to
abolish the long-standing "complete diversity" rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss," in cases that presented a prospect of dispersed litigation over
the same subject matter, permitting federal jurisdiction in such cases to
be based instead on the existence of "minimal diversity" between any
two adverse parties in the action, provided that certain other conditions
raising the prospect of dispersed litigation arising out of the same trans-
action were present. 9 Those conditions generally were met whenever
"any defendant has a residence in a state other than the one in which a
substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the action oc-
14. Id. at 9.
15. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1932).
16. Rowe & Sibley, supra note i, at 14-15.
17. Id. at 15.
i8. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (18o6).
i9. Rowe & Sibley, supra note I, at 19, 49 (appendix setting forth proposed statute). The authors'
proposal excluded cases in which such a dispersal of events and defendant residence did not exist on
the ground that, in such cases, all litigation regarding the matter would likely be forced into a single
state court, and that such cases would not present the problem of "scattered litigation" that was their
central concern. They acknowledged that in such cases "vertical" dispersal of litigation between fed-
eral and state courts of the same state might take place. Id. at 25-26, 50-5I. This exclusion may have
resulted from Professor Rowe's view that general diversity jurisdiction should be abolished altogether,
in which event such "vertical" scattering of litigation could not occur. Recognizing that the general
grant of diversity jurisdiction might not be abolished, the authors suggested that a "special provision"
might be adopted to deal with vertical dispersion. Id. at 5o-5I.
February 2004]
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curred." ° In Rowe and Sibley's view, dispersed litigation of the same
subject matter was likely in such cases because defendants would be
amenable to suit on the same transaction in more than one state, but the
complete diversity rule prevented the joinder or consolidation of all such
claims in federal court, where nationwide service of process could be au-
thorized.'
Rowe and Sibley had no difficulty in concluding that their proposal
was consistent with the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. In their view, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Tashire" had
established beyond debate that the complete diversity requirement of
Strawbridge was "one of statutory construction only and not a constitu-
tional limitation binding Congress." 3 Relying without further analysis on
Tashire's conclusion that federal interpleader jurisdiction based on
minimal diversity was constitutional, they assumed that "no constitu-
tional barriers" stood in the way of their proposed extension of federal
jurisdiction. 4 The validity of that unelaborated conclusion provides the
central focus of this Article.
Significantly in light of later enactments and proposals taking the
same tack, Rowe and Sibley did not limit their proposed extension of the
federal diversity jurisdiction to original or removed cases involving
"minimal diversity" between at least two adverse parties to the action.
Rather, they proposed to authorize removal by any party to a claim in an
action pending in state court, even if it was based entirely on state law
and was exclusively between citizens of the same state, provided only
that it arose out of the "same transaction, occurrence, or series of related
transactions or occurrences" as an action meeting the requirements of
the statute already pending in federal court. 5
20. Id. at 26. The authors believed that this situation would exist whenever two defendants re-
sided in different states, as well as where a defendant resided in one state and part of the acts or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere. Id.
21. Id. at i9.
22. 386 U.S. 523 (1967)
23. Rowe & Sibley, supra note I, at 22.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 55. Rowe and Sibley's proposed removal provision provided:
Any party to a claim in an action pending in a State court that arises out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of related transactions or occurrences as an action pending
within the jurisdiction of the district courts under section 1367 of this title may remove that
claim to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such claim is pending even if the claim is not otherwise removable pursuant to
this section.
Id. Rowe and Sibley justified allowing all parties to a claim to remove to federal court from state court
without regard to party citizenship on efficiency grounds, stating that in some situations "a plaintiff
could not have brought a federal action (in the absence of minimal diversity) and may have appropri-
ately sued in state court, and it might be too cumbersome to sort out cases in which plaintiffs could and
[Vol. 55:613
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A significant feature of the Rowe and Sibley proposal was its explicit
recognition that it was, in many applications, not specifically designed to
address the problem of prejudice against out-of-state litigants that was
the central concern of the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction.
However, the existence of "minimal diversity" nevertheless was thought
to provide an adequate jurisdictional "hinge" to permit the achievement
of unrelated efficiency goals. Many have echoed Rowe and Sibley's
strong antipathy to duplicative and wasteful intra- and inter-system litiga-
tion (among and between federal and state courts) and advocated vari-
ous legislative and judicial solutions to prevent it.2
6
Despite a broad consensus that strong measures are required to
avoid overlapping federal and state litigation on efficiency grounds, an
occasional dissident voice has emerged. For the most part, the debate has
focused on issues of policy, but occasionally reservations have surfaced
bearing on the extent of federal power to eliminate undesirable duplica-
tion through mandatory consolidation in federal court. Professor Richard
Epstein raised early warnings in both respects in a commentary directed
to a preliminary draft of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project, previ-
ously discussed.27 On policy grounds, Professor Epstein argued that the
ALI's proposal unduly impaired important fairness concerns and was
likely to achieve far less in efficiency gains that its proponents believed.2
could not readily have sued in federal court." Id. at 56. They also argued that "if removal is of claims
rather than of actions, defendants with a monopoly on the right to remove might try to engage in tacti-
cal maneuvers involving removal of one claim on which they were sued but not another." Id. Thus,
both plaintiffs and defendants should have the ability to remove claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence to federal court to avoid unfair manipulation by the defendant.
Rowe and Sibley also noted the impact of their proposed removal provision on § I44i(b)'s exist-
ing limitations on removal, recognizing that "[t]he draft's 'even if not otherwise removable' language
would override existing § I44i(b)'s limitation on removal in diversity cases to those involving no
home-state defendants." Id. However, they dismissed the policy behind § I44I(b), of protecting only
out-of-state defendants, calling § I44i(b)'s limitation irrelevant "since our concern is not prejudice but
scattered litigation." Id.
26. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note i. In a recent article, Professor Martin Redish advocated
what he termed a "zero tolerance solution" to the problem of duplicative litigation. See Martin H. Re-
dish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the
Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000). Noting the burdens, waste, and
potential harassment that result from overlapping federal and state litigation of the same subject mat-
ter, he criticized current restrictive interpretations of the Anti-Injunction Act and the abstention doc-
trines that, in most circumstances, prohibit federal courts either from enjoining duplicative state court
litigation or, in the alternative, from abstaining in favor of the state proceedings. Id. at 1355-6o. He
proposed that "any and all intersystemic duplicative litigation [is] unacceptable" and that a federal
court should be required in all cases either to enjoin duplicative state proceedings or abstain in their
favor. Id. at 1361.
27. Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the
ALl Proposal, to J.L. & Com. i (i99o). See also infra text accompanying notes 32-56.
28. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 7-9, 15-18.
February 20041
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In his view, the ALl also had overstated the interest in consistent out-
comes, failing to explain why different outcomes from identical lawsuits
should be of concern.29
Finally, Professor Epstein cautioned that massive consolidation of
non-diverse state court litigation of the kind contemplated by the ALI
likely exceeded the scope of the diversity and federal question jurisdic-
tion conferred on the federal courts by Article 11.30 Foreshadowing the
focus of this Article, he noted that the proposal expanded the use of
"minimal diversity" far beyond the concept of "necessity" that had given
it birth, and observed that "Congress does not have the power to define
the contours of a case in whatever way it sees fit, any more than it can
expand federal jurisdiction as it sees fit."'" These preliminary suggestions
deserve much more attention than they have received to date. The press-
ing need for full consideration of the limits of minimal diversity has be-
come even more imperative with the enactment of the Multiparty,
Multiforum Act and the prospect that the proposed class action jurisdic-
tion legislation may be enacted by the current Congress.
B. THE ALl PROPOSAL AND ITS POLICY AND
JURISDICTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
In 1994, the ALI, building on the work of Rowe and Sibley and oth-
ers, issued a report proposing a number of statutory revisions designed to
address the problem of overlapping and duplicative federal/state litiga-
tion of the same subject matter.32 The ALI based its recommendations on
the conclusion that repeated litigation of common issues "unduly ex-
pends the resources of attorney and client, burdens already overcrowded
dockets, delays recompense for those in need, results in disparate treat-
ment for persons harmed by essentially identical or similar conduct, and
contributes to the negative image many people have of the legal sys-
tem .
33
The Report concluded that section 1407 of the Judicial Code,34 which
authorizes consolidation in a single federal court of multiple pending
federal proceedings for pretrial purposes, had failed to provide "anything
like a comprehensive solution for the complex litigation problem,"35 both
29. In fact the outcome of a lawsuit depends not only on the facts and the law, but also on "a wide
range of other factors, which at a minimum include the attitudes towards risk that the parties bring to
the litigation and the strategic choices that the lawyers make in handling the case." Id. at 20.
30. Id. at 34-49.
31. Id. at 38.
32. ALl REPORT, supra note i.
33. Id. at 7.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
35. ALl REPORT, supra note i, at 9.
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because it authorized consolidation for pretrial purposes only36 and be-
cause it failed to provide a mechanism for consolidating overlapping liti-
gation pending simultaneously in both federal and state courts.37 Other
existing devices, such as party joinder, class actions, and interpleader,
were not well designed to deal with dispersed mass tort litigation on a
comprehensive basis." The drafters of the ALI Report regarded a new
consolidation regime for the "units of a complex dispute" as essential to
complex litigation reform. Although recognizing that consolidation could
create problems of its own by becoming so unwieldy that it would gener-
ate no efficiency gains and by impairing litigant autonomy, the Report
regarded these concerns as overdrawn.39 Rather, it concluded that joinder
through consolidation "can promote justice as well as efficiency by ensur-
ing consistent court rulings and the fair division of limited funds."'4 The
centerpiece of the ALI's proposal was a new procedure allowing for the
consolidation of actions pending in two or more U.S. District Courts that
involved "one or more common questions of fact," where "transfer and
consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the ac-
tions."'" The decision to transfer and consolidate under the ALI's pro-
posed flexible standard was to be made by a newly created Complex
Litigation Panel composed of federal judges.42
The drafters of the ALI Report recognized that, standing alone,
their proposal for consolidation of federal litigation involving common
questions of fact would not solve the problem of inefficient dispersed
litigation they sought to resolve. That was because claims arising out of a
single event or transaction "frequently may be filed in both the federal
and state court systems."43 For that reason, the Report combined its pro-
posed consolidation procedure with a procedure for removal from state
36. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (holding
that, although § 14o7(a) authorizes civil actions with common issues of fact to be consolidated in any
district court for pretrial proceedings, § 1404(a), allowing transfer of a case from one district court to
any other where the case could originally have been brought for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, may not be invoked by the district court conducting the consolidated pretrial proceedings to
assign transferred cases to itself for trial).
37. See ALI REPORT, supra note i, at 21-23 (stating that § 1407 was designed to allow transfer of
"related lawsuits pending in different federal district courts to a single district judge for pretrial pro-
ceedings" and that centralization under § 1407, combined with other statutory and procedural devices
"often is clumsy and jurisdiction and venue restrictions may prevent complete unitary treatment of the
individual cases").
38. Id. at 24-29 (describing the inadequacies of party joinder under existing rules 19, 20, 23, and
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
39. Id. at i8-s9.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 3.oI(a)(I), (2), at 37.
42. Id. § 3.02, at 62.
43. Id. at 217.
February 2004]
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to federal court of state law actions arising from "the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as an action pending
in the federal court," provided that they "share a common question of
fact" with the federal action.' Such removal might be initiated by any
party to the state court action or on certification of the state trial judge
presiding over the action.45 Decision to permit removal and consolidation
with the federal action was to be made by the Complex Litigation Panel
with reference to the criteria established by section 3.01 for consolidation
and transfer of duplicative federal actions, and on consideration of
whether removal would "unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or
regulatory proceedings or impose an undue burden on the federal
courts."" Operation of the removal provision did not require that a fed-
eral "magnet" action already exist (although, when it did, the removal
decision was said to be "easy"), but could be based on the pendency of a
single overlapping federal action.47 Most importantly, there was no re-
quirement that the removed action fall independently within the federal
arising under or diversity jurisdiction.
A central feature of the ALI's proposal for dramatic expansion of
removal jurisdiction was to solve the problem of overlapping fed-
eral/state litigation by authorizing the removal of purely state law claims
in which none of the adverse parties were of diverse citizenship. The
commentary noted that the purpose of its proposal was not to protect
non-citizens from prejudice, as in the normal diversity removal situation.
Rather, "[i]n the dispersed litigation situation... the objective of re-
moval is to increase the overall efficiency of the adjudicatory process and
to foster fairness and justice to the litigants." 8
The ALI gave short shrift to the issue of congressional power to
provide for removal of non-diverse state law cases that were transaction-
ally related to an existing federal action. It concluded that the presence
of a federal action to which the removed state action would be "at-
tached" and the requirement that the state action be "transactionally re-
lated" to the federal action "means that the assertion of [federal subject
matter] jurisdiction over those actions is analogous to the court's sup-
plemental jurisdiction powers" conferred by section 5.03 of the pro-
posal.49 Section 5.03 provided that the federal transferee court should
have subject matter jurisdiction over any claim that arose from the same
44. Id. § 5.oI(a), at 220-21.
45. Id. § 5.01(e), at 221-22.
46. Id. § 5.oI(a), at 221.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id. at 242.
49. Id. at 234.
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transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as a
claim transferred under section 3.0I or removed under section 5.01.50 In-
voking concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed in such
cases as United Mine Workers v. Gibbs" and Owen Equipment & Erec-
tion Company v. Kroger," the comments asserted that such removed
non-diverse state law claims formed part of the same "constitutional
case" as the claims properly filed in federal court under federal question
or diversity jurisdiction.53 This conclusion is explored in greater depth be-
low.
Later, however, the comments suggested a different foundation for
asserting Article III jurisdiction over such cases. Unlike the current sup-
plemental jurisdiction statute, which seeks to preserve the long-standing
requirement of complete diversity in actions involving supplemental
claims,54 the ALI's proposal dispensed with any requirement for com-
plete diversity of the parties in the consolidated federal action (and in-
deed, with any requirement for diversity at all in the removed action
itself). The comments noted that the proposal "departs from the com-
plete diversity rule" in favor of jurisdiction based on "minimal diver-
sity"5 (presumably between any two adverse parties in the consolidated
proceedings regardless of the existence of diversity in the removed or
transferred action itself). They argued that "because complete diversity
always has been deemed a statutory, rather than a constitutional, limita-
tion [citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Tashire], the decision
50. Id. § 5.03(a)(I), at 256. Section 5.03 also provides for supplemental jurisdiction over related
claims for indemnification. Id. § 5.o3(a)(2), at 256.
51. 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966).
52. 437 U.S. 365,377 (978).
53. ALI REPORT, supra note I, at 258. However, the drafters noted, without further analysis, that
"[tihis is not to suggest that the jurisdiction proposed here is exactly coextensive with traditional ancil-
lary and pendent jurisdiction caselaw because the jurisdiction asserted in those contexts has been in sin-
gle cases, where as supplemental jurisdiction under § 5.03 is being extended over consolidated cases." Id.
at 258-59 (emphasis added).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000). Scholars have recognized and debated the deficiencies and
drafting ambiguities in section 1367. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at
Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (i9I); Christo-
pher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The Case of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S. C
§ 1367, 19 SETON HALL LEGoS. J. 157 (1994); Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hamper-
ing Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (99');
Darren J. Gold, Supplemental Jurisdiction over Claims by Plaintiffs in Diversity Cases: Making Sense
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), 93 MICH. L. REV. 2133 (1995); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 Amuz. ST. L.J. 849 (1992); James E.
Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. In9 (i999); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Sup-
plemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (i99I).
55. ALl REPORT, supra note I, at 260.
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C. THE MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF 2002
Although the ALI proposal itself has not resulted in legislative ac-
tion, proposals aimed at the same general objective have been presented
to Congress beginning as early as 1978, culminating in the enactment of
the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002."7 These pro-
posals, however, more closely resemble Rowe and Sibley's original pro-
posal for a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction act than the more
encompassing ALI proposal."
In its earlier versions, the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act
broadly conferred original federal court jurisdiction over litigation in-
volving minimal diversity arising in circumstances that might be expected
to give rise to dispersed litigation challenging the same wrongful con-
56. Id. (emphasis added) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967)). The
Institute did give at least lip service to the important issues of federalism that its proposal involved. It
noted that "simply to federalize these cases would represent a major intrusion on the current distribu-
tion of judicial business between federal and state courts," and, as previously noted, instructed the
Complex Litigation Panel to consider "whether removal would unduly disrupt or impinge upon state
court or regulatory proceedings" in determining whether it should be allowed as a matter of discretion.
Id. at 217, § 5.0(a), at 221. However, the provisions and general tone of the proposal consistently sub-
ordinated federalism interests to those of judicial economy to be achieved through federal consolida-
tion. Thus, where state court litigation was spread across several states, the comments argued that the
interests of federalism should give way to the need for judicial economy and consistent outcomes.
Although it may be argued that inconsistent results caused by the application of varying
laws is an expected cost of maintaining the federal system, reducing inconsistencies when
additional factors suggest that consolidated treatment of related cases is merited is a legiti-
mate reason supporting removal. Indeed, the desire to avoid inconsistent findings on identi-
cal fact questions.., is an important value to be fostered in order to encourage the public
perception of the courts as reliable and just.
Id. at 232.
57. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, ii6 Stat.
1758, 1826 (2002). See Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hearing on S.2o94, S. 2389, and
H.R. 9622 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery, 95th Cong. 61 (I978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings]. These hearings were held to consider S. 2094, S.
2389, and H.R. 9622, which would have limited the scope Federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
by not allowing a plaintiff to invoke diversity jurisdiction within a district where the plaintiff was a citi-
zen, and to consider the value of diversity jurisdiction in general. See id. at 61. Alan B. Morrison, the
director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, D.C., advocated limiting diversity ju-
risdiction, but only if a multiparty litigation amendment was also passed. Id. at 179 (statement of Alan
B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.). At these hearings, Morri-
son, on behalf of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, presented a proposed amendment to the legisla-
tion then being considered, "which would create a separate section under Title 28 to deal with large-
scale torts where the sole basis of jurisdiction would be diversity." Id. at 181 (statement of Alan B.
Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
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duct. 9 As enacted in 2002, however, the Act was dramatically scaled
back in an apparent effort to minimize its impact on state and federal ju-
risdiction, and thus to address federalism arguments that had been raised
in opposition to its passage." The Act limits its coverage to any civil ac-
59. See, e.g., Diversity Jurisdiction Reform and Multiparty Injury Jurisdiction Act of 1983, H.R.
369o, 98th Cong. § 4 (1983). The 1983 proposal is typical of earlier versions. The jurisdictional grant
language of the 1983 Bill was as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising out of a single
event, transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct that results in personal injury or injury
to the property of twenty-five or more persons if the sum or value of the injury alleged in
good faith to have been incurred by any twenty-five persons exceeds $io,ooo per person,
exclusive of interest and costs, and the action:
(i) is between a plaintiff who is a citizen of a State and any defendants, so long as any de-
fendant and any person injured in the event, transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct is
a citizen of a State different from that of any plaintiff;
(2) involves a party who is a citizen of a State and any adverse party which is a foreign state
as defined in section 16o3(a) of this title or who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state; or
(3) any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a citizen of a different State, and
any other defendant resides in a different State.
Id. (emphasis added).
Once an action was properly pending in a district court in accordance with the above provision,
any person injured in "the single event, transaction, occurrence or course of conduct which is the basis
of the action brought shall be permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in any such action even if the
action could not have been brought originally in a district court by such person." H.R. 369o § 4. The
Bill further allowed "any defendant in such action who is also a defendant in a civil action brought in a
state court based upon the same single event, transaction, occurrence or course of conduct which is the
basis of the action brought in the district court" to "remove the action to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending even if the
action is not otherwise removable under section I44I." Id.
6o. As multiparty, multiforum legislation has been introduced over the years various groups and
individuals have opposed it on federalism grounds. The American Legislative Exchange Council criti-
cized a version of the Bill introduced at the ioist Congress because it represented too much federali-
zation of tort law; the benefits are not
sufficient to justify either the denigration of the role of state judges that is inherent in an ef-
fort to shift tort litigation from state to federal court judges or the denigration of the public
policies embodied in state common law and statutes governing personal injury litigation
that is inherent in the effort to impose a single state's law on all issues arising out of a single
mass disaster.
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 3406 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice, IOIst Cong. 247 (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 Hearings] (letter from Samuel A. Brunelli, Executive Director, American Legislative
Exchange Council to The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Congressman (Nov. 22, 1989)).
Others also expressed concerns that the multiparty, multiforum legislation would be too great an
encroachment on state power, arguing that how a state chooses to compensate its citizens in tort cases
ought to be left up to the states. A witness at hearings held during the iolst Congress noted that, un-
der the Bill, a "federal court could ... dictate what happens between a plaintiff and defendant who are
both citizens of the same state and yet are forced to accept substantive law which has no relevance to
either of them." Id. at 251 (letter from Nicholas Gilman, P.C., Gilman, Olson & Pangia, Washington,
D.C. to The Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Congressman (Nov. 21, 1989)). "[I]f a state wishes to
permit litigation in its own courts against its own citizens regardless of where the mass disaster oc-
curred, this state interest and its 'sovereignty' to do so could be subverted by federal removal under"
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tion involving "minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises
from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the
accident at a discrete location," and where one defendant resides in a
state different from that in which the accident took place, any two defen-
dants reside in different states, or substantial parts of the accident oc-
curred in different states.6 ' The intent of the qualifications is to identify
situations in which duplicative litigation arising from the same accident is
likely to arise in more than one state. The statute continues to define
corporate citizenship in the same manner as the general diversity statute,
the proposed multiparty legislation. Id. (letter from Nicholas Gilman, P.C., Gilman, Olson & Pangia,
Washington, D.C. to The Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Congressman (Nov. 2 1, 1989)).
The Conference of Chief Justices of State Courts voiced concerns about the legislation at hear-
ings for the Bill that was introduced at the Io2d Congress, arguing that the Bill preempts state tort law,
an area traditionally of state concern. Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of i99i: Hearing on
H.R. 2450 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, Io2d
Cong. 19 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Hearings] (letter from Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., President of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices). The Conference felt that there was no evidence that state courts are not capa-
ble of handling large cases that arise out of a single accident and that such legislation "would interfere
with the independence of state courts by authorizing bifurcated trials under which federal courts
would determine the governing legal principles." Id. at 20. See also id. at 70, 75-76 (statement of
Robert A. Sedler, Professor of Law, Wayne State University); 107 CONG. REC. H895 (Mar. t4, 2001)
(statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee); 107 CONG. REC. H896 (Mar. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Watt).
Other witnesses commented that, although judicial efficiency is important, state sovereignty con-
cerns override efficiency concerns. These witnesses argued that any litigation that seeks to consolidate
such large actions should "balance the needs of the injured parties and the proper respect for State law
and State courts against any efficiencies that might be achieved." Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2112 and
H.R. 1752 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., io6th
Cong. 68 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Hearings] (statement of Brian Wolfman, Staff Attorney, Public Citi-
zen Litigation Group). Although "these one-size-fits-all rulings are efficient to be sure, but they de-
prive parties of their State law rights and, in that respect, are an affront to Federalism because they are
made without regard to differences among State laws." Id. at 69 (statement of Brian Wolfman, Staff
Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group). Attorney Lee Kriendler stated, "we sometimes forget that
this is a search for justice, and justice means the sensitive application of the right law, the sensitive ap-
plication of the law of a State that has an interest in having its law applied. Now, that is important; that
means something." Id. at 122 (statement of Lee S. Kreindler, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York,
N.Y.).
61. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1o7-273, § Io2o(b)(i)(A),
I16 Stat. 1758, 1826 (2002) (emphasis added) (adding § 1369(a) to 28 U.S.C.). The Multiparty, Multifo-
rum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 also requires the district court to abstain from jurisdiction in any
case in which a substantial majority of the plaintiffs are citizens of a single state of which the defendant
also is a citizen and the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that state. Id.
§ 11020(b)(i)(A) (adding § 1369(b) to 28 U.S.C.). The 1999 Bill (H.R. 2112, io6th Cong. (ist Sess.
1999)), like earlier versions of the Multiparty, Multiforum bills contained detailed choice of law provi-
sions. See, e.g., Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1987, H.R. 3152, tooth Cong. (ist Sess.
1987); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 3406, iolst Cong. (ist Sess. 1989); Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 2450, x02d Cong. (ist Sess. 1991). However, these provisions were
removed from the most recent versions of the Bill. See Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Ju-
risdiction Act, H.R. 86o, Io7th Cong. (ist Sess. 2001).
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under which a corporation is deemed a citizen of each state in which it is
incorporated and of the state in which it has its principal place of busi-
ness. 2 In addition to its basic provision for original district court jurisdic-
tion, the Act also includes a provision for intervention of right in any
litigation commenced under its provisions by any other plaintiff having a
claim arising from the same accident, regardless of whether that plaintiff
is of diverse citizenship from any defendant." Of even greater import, it
provides for removal from state court by any defendant who is
a party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in
part, under [the proposed act] in a United States district court and
arises from the same accident as the [removed action], even if the ac-
tion to be removed could not have been brought in a district court as an
original matter.6'
In essence, the current Multiparty, Multiforum Act applies only to
"a very narrowly defined category of cases," such as airplane accidents. 65
In view of its stringent limitations, the Act has evolved into a modest al-
teration of existing jurisdictional rules.66 But the jurisdictional theories it
espouses have broad implications, and equally would support enormous
intrusions on the jurisdiction and functioning of the state courts, such as
the ALI proposal and the much broader earlier versions of the Bill. For
this reason, in depth examination of its underlying "minimal diversity"
jurisdictional theory is essential. This is particularly so in light of the
Act's broad provisions for intervention by parties having no diversity to
any adverse party, and for removal of stand alone state court actions that
involve no diversity of citizenship at all.
62. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 § I020(b)(I)(A) (adding § 1369(c)(2)
to 28 U.S.C.).
63. § I Io2o(b)(i)(A) (adding § 1369(d) to 28 U.S.C.).
64. § IbO2o(b)( 3 )(B) (adding § I44I(e)(I) to 28 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
65. H.R. REP. No. Io6-276, at 21 (1999) (concurring minority views on H.R. 2112, io6th Cong.
(ist Sess. 1999)). The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 was based on the legisla-
tive record and reports compiled in connection with earlier versions of the Bill. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 685 (2002).
66. The minority views on House Bill 2112 by members of Congress who have strongly opposed
broad class action reform on federalism grounds found its narrow provisions "an effective means by
which to improve the manageability of complex litigation. In this narrow circumstance, we feel that
there is sufficient justification to expand federal court jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. io6-276, at 2o. Al-
though they
generally oppose having federal courts decide state tort issues where complete diversity is
not present.., we also believe that in the narrow circumstance of single accident injuries
with multiple parties from different states, there may be legitimate reasons to consolidate
cases concerning the same accident in one federal forum. Litigating the same liability ques-
tion several times over in separate lawsuits may waste judicial resources and may be costly




Examination of the Multiparty, Multiforum Act is important for an-
other reason. Unlike the proposed class action jurisdiction legislation,
the drafters of the Act have made no real effort to tie its provisions to
any recognized purpose of the diversity jurisdiction. They simply as-
sumed that the U.S. Supreme Court's Tashire decision provided ample
support for jurisdiction based on "minimal diversity." The Act itself,
however, is not aimed at preventing local bias against out-of-state liti-
gants or even at promoting "nationalization" by assuring a competent
and neutral federal forum for multistate business enterprises conducting
business away from home. Rather, the Act has been justified on the
grounds of judicial efficiency. As the House Report on the 1999 version
of the Bill pointed out, in the litigation it covers, such as a major airline
disaster, repeated litigation of the same liability issue will occur if sepa-
rate suits by different victims are maintained. "The waste of judicial re-
sources-and the costs to both plaintiffs and defendants-of litigating
the same liability question several times over in separate lawsuits can be
extreme." ' The proposed Bill was intended to "reduce litigation costs as
well as the likelihood of forum-shopping in airline accident cases; and an
effective one-time determination of punitive damages would eliminate
multiple or inconsistent awards arising from multiforum litigation.
61
D. THE CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION ACTS AND THEIR POLICY AND
JURISDICTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
In the mid-i99os, Congress began considering a somewhat different
approach to complex litigation reform. These proposals focused not on
multiforum, multiparty litigation as such, but rather on state court class
actions which were thought by sponsors of the legislation to have been
abused to the detriment of corporate defendants carrying on operations
in many states.
69
The most recent fully considered version of this legislation is the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, which passed the House of Represen-
tatives on June 12, 2003 and is pending in the Senate.7' The heart of the
Bill is its proposal to permit the filing in federal court, or the removal
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115 and S. 274, io8th Cong. (ist Sess. 2003). For
previous versions of the Bill, see Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, to7th Cong. (2002);
Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, io7th Cong. (2001); Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction
Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, io6th Cong. (I999); Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, xo6th Cong.
(1999); Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, I05th Cong. (1998); Class Action Fairness
Act of 1998, S. 2083, io5th Cong. (1998).
70. See H.R. I I15 and S. 274. At this writing, a proposed substitute, S. 1751, is pending before the
Senate. The revisions made by S. 1751 do not affect the basic arguments advanced here.
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from state court, of any class action" provided that any member of the
class is of diverse citizenship from any defendant and the total matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,0o0 exclusive of interest
and costs,72 with certain exceptions.73 These proposals again represent a
repeal, in the class action context, of the "complete diversity" rule of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,74 and assume that basing federal jurisdiction on
the existence of such "minimal diversity" falls clearly within the scope of
Article III." They also overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive
holding in Snyder v. Harris requiring each member of a federal diversity
class action independently to satisfy the amount in controversy require-
ment (now $75,000) unless the interests of the class members are "com-
mon and undivided. ' 76 Additionally, where class actions meeting these
relaxed jurisdictional requirements are filed in state court, the Bill allows
any defendant, or, after class certification, any nonnamed member of the
class, to remove the action without the concurrence of other defendants
or class members." This removal provision alters three long-standing
provisions of the Judicial Code restricting removal only to defendants,
requiring all defendants to join in the notice of removal, and providing
that an action may not be removed from state to federal court if any de-
fendant is a citizen of the state from which removal is sought. The valid-
ity of these fundamental changes in removal practice is discussed in
greater depth below.7s
Finally, the Act provides that if a class action originally filed in or
removed to federal court under its provisions is determined by the fed-
eral district court not to satisfy the requirements for certification as a
71. Section 4 of the Bill, which amends the general diversity statute by adding a new § 1332(d),
defines "class action" to include any
civil action filed in a District Court of the United States pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or any civil action that is removed to a district court of the United
States that was originally filed pursuant to a State statute or rule of judicial procedure au-
thorizing an action to brought by one or more representative persons on behalf of a class.
H.R. III15 § 4.
72. Id. § 4(a).
73. Id. (adding § 1332(d)(3) permitting the district court to decline jurisdiction where greater than
one-third and less than two-thirds of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the
State in which the action was filed; adding § 1332(d)(4)(A) excluding cases where two-thirds of the
class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed; adding § 1332(d)(4)(B) excepting any action where the primary defendants are States, their offi-
cials, or other governmental entities "against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering
relief"; adding § I332(d)(4)(C) excepting actions in which the number of proposed class members is
less than Ioo).
74. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (18o6).
75. See H.R. REP. No. Io8-I44, at Io n.I1 (2003).
76. 394 U.S. 332, 355 (1969)-
77. H.R. I115 § 5 (adding § 1453 to the Judicial Code).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 211-41.
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class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,79 the
court "shall dismiss" the action." Although the statutory language is not
entirely clear, it suggests that plaintiffs may refile their action in state
court as either a class or individual action, but provides that such an ac-
tion may again be removed to federal court if it meets the requirements
for original federal jurisdiction, including, presumably, the newly relaxed
jurisdictional requirements of the Act."
The Act includes declarations of Findings and Purposes supporting
its enactment,2 which are fleshed out in the House Report. Primarily, it
proceeds on the assumption that state court class actions recently have
been subject to "abuses of the class action device"' 83 that have harmed
class members and defendants. Class members are thought to have been
harmed by coupon settlements of little or no value accompanied by large
fee awards to class counsel, by preferential awards to some plaintiffs at
the expense of other class members, by confusing class notices disabling
class members from understanding and exercising their rights, and by in-
adequate scrutiny of class actions and settlements by state courts.84 De-
fendants are said to have been harmed by being "forced into settlements,
in order to avoid the possibility of huge judgments that could destabilize
their companies."s5 In an apparent attempt to establish a tie to the pur-
poses of the diversity jurisdiction, the Act finds that state courts are han-
dling class actions that "affect parties from many states," and those
courts "sometimes [act] in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-
State defendants." 6 As discussed below, however, some of the most im-
portant aspects of the Act itself have no apparent link to the desire to
protect out-of state defendants or businesses from the impact of local
bias.s7 In particular, the Act makes no effort to modify the general defini-
tion of corporate citizenship for diversity purposes as including both the
state of incorporation and the state of the corporation's principal place of
business,88 nor does it confine its removal authorization to out-of-state
corporations or class members who might be thought to be subject to lo-
cal bias.
79. All further rule references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise speci-
fied.
8o. H.R. I 115 § 4 (adding new § 1332(d)(7)(A) to the Judicial Code).
8i. Id. § 4(a) (adding new § 1332(d)(7)(B)). The Act also tolls both federal and state limitations
periods on refiled claims under specified circumstances. Id. (adding new § 133 2(d)(7)(C)).
82. Id. § 2. See H.R. REP. No. Io8-i44, at 6-22.
83. H.R. Iii 5 § 2(a)(2)(A).
84. See id. § 2(a)(3)-(5).
85. Id. § 2(a)(4)(C); § 2(a)(6).
86. Id. § 2(a)(5).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 211-47.
88. See 28 U.S.C. § I332(C)(I) (2000).
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In elaborating on these findings, the House Report broadly con-
demns the adequacy of state court class action procedures and process. It
concludes that many state courts "employ very lax class certification cri-
teria" and that they "approve settlements with little-if any-regard for
class certification standards or the interests of class members." ' The Re-
port also concludes that permitting state class actions to proceed is ineffi-
cient because, when overlapping class actions are filed in federal court,
they may be transferred to a single district for coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings, whereas no such mechanism is available for
overlapping state class actions pending in more than one state.' The Re-
port suggests that state courts simply are not up to the task of handling
complex litigation.9 It also argues that state courts hearing interstate
class actions are inappropriately establishing "national policy" by apply-
ing their own laws to transactions in other states, thus "dictating the sub-
stantive laws of other states," or by misinterpreting the laws of those
states.92 The Report contends that "interstate class actions" are appropri-
ately heard in federal rather than state court because they "affect more
citizens, involve more money, and implicate more interstate commerce
issues than any other type of lawsuit."93 It also argues that state court
class action abuses "adversely affect interstate commerce, and undermine
public respect for our judicial system. '
As discussed below, some of these concerns may, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, provide an appropriate basis for the conferral of federal di-
versity jurisdiction. Others, such as the desire to promote judicial
economy (standing alone), the large size of the litigation, or the alleged
incompetence of state courts to handle large scale class action litigation,
are not, without more, sufficient to warrant the massive transfer of power
from the state to the federal judiciaries that the Act seeks to effect. The
core of the problem lies in the failure of the Act to tailor its jurisdictional
provisions to the purposes underlying Article III's grant of diversity ju-
risdiction to the federal courts.
89. H.R. REP. No. Io8-i44, at 12 (2003).
9o. Id. at 15.
91. Id. at 24 (arguing that state courts "have fewer resources for dealing with huge, complex
cases, like class actions," and that state court judges "are not as familiar with" choice of law issues pre-
sented by complex cases as are federal judges).
92. Id. at 13-14, 26.
93. Id. at 7; see also id. at 20 (arguing that interstate class actions warrant access to federal courts
because they typically have the most money in controversy, involve the most people and have the most
interstate commerce ramifications).
94. Id. at 33.
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II. THE TASHIRE DECISION
Both the pending class action proposal and Multiparty, Multiforum
Act rely centrally on the U.S. Supreme Court's Tashire decision95 in their
assumption that the existence of "minimal diversity" between any two
adverse parties in an action or-in the case of the Multiparty, Multifo-
rum Act, in a group of related actions-provides the necessary "hinge"
for the assertion of federal diversity jurisdiction. The holding of Tashire
is far more limited.
Tashire was an interpleader case. No matter what model of federal
jurisdiction might be adopted, the assertion of federal authority based on
the existence of "minimal diversity" between any two adverse claimants
to a single fund or stake plainly is justified. From an historic viewpoint,
the concept of equitable interpleader to resolve conflicting claims to a
single "stake" on the ground of the inadequacy of the remedy at law was
well established at the time the Constitution was adopted. 6 From a nec-
essary and proper standpoint, it seems clear that, provided any two ad-
verse claimants to a single stake are of diverse citizenship, the purposes
of the Diversity Clause would be served by permitting one of them to
rely upon federal jurisdiction to resolve its dispute with the diverse
claimant. That being so, in a case such as Tashire, involving multiple
claimants asserting mutually inconsistent claims to the same fund or
stake, the assertion of federal jurisdiction over all the claimants is neces-
sary to permit the federal court to render a meaningful judgment, and to
prevent practical prejudice to the non-diverse claimants. In this respect,
Tashire falls directly in the line of Supreme Court decisions running back
at least to Freeman v. Howe,' sustaining "ancillary jurisdiction" over
95. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967). Tashire considered the appropri-
ate scope of an interpleader action arising out of potentially inconsistent claims to a limited insurance
fund. Id. at 531-35.
96. See sources cited infra note I17.
97. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (186o). In Freeman, the Supreme Court, in holding that a state court
had no power to issue a writ of replevin with respect to property attached by a federal marshall as se-
curity for a judgment in a federal diversity action, rejected the contention of the plaintiffs in the state
replevin action that the federal action provided them with no effective remedy because they were not
diverse from the defendant in the federal action. The Court reasoned that their claims to the property
would be "ancillary and dependent" to those in the federal action. Id. at 460. See also White v. Ewing,
159 U.S. 36, 38 (1895) (permitting federal receiver of insolvent corporation to sue non diverse debtors
to collect the assets of the estate). But see Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925) (re-
jecting intervention of non diverse party in federal insolvency proceedings because there was no logi-
cal dependency between his claims and the insolvency proceedings). In Hozier, the court stated that
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non-diverse claims that are logically dependent for their resolution on
diversity claims properly before the federal court. Additionally, federal
jurisdiction is particularly appropriate-and thus "necessary and
proper"-in interpleader cases involving multiple claimants not all of
which can be subjected to jurisdiction in any one state court because of
constitutional limits on the assertion of jurisdiction over their persons.
98
In such cases, only a federal court, with its attendant power to serve
process nationwide, can provide a forum for the disposition of the con-
flicting claims of diverse as well as non-diverse claimants to the stake.
Tashire thus involved the clearest case for the assertion of federal ju-
risdiction based on "minimal diversity," which perhaps makes the U.S.
Supreme Court's very truncated analysis of the question of constitutional
power more understandable. The Court's discussion consisted solely of
the statement that "in a variety of contexts this Court and the lower
courts have concluded that Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative
extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two
adverse parties are not co-citizens."'  This statement, however, should
not be read, as the proponents of the class action jurisdiction proposal
and the Multiparty, Multiforum Act appear to have done, to stand for
the proposition that federal jurisdiction based on the existence of mini-
mal diversity between any two adverse parties clearly is constitutional "in
all contexts." Tashire must be read carefully in light of the limited con-
text of necessity in which it arose, and the authorities on which it relied,
in determining the extent to which it supports the recent sweeping pro-
posals for the extension of federal diversity jurisdiction."
[t]he general rule is that when a federal court has properly acquired jurisdiction over a
cause it may entertain, by intervention, dependent or ancillary controversies; but no contro-
versy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless it has [a] direct relation to property or
assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal
suit.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518,522 (i956).
99. Tashire, 386 U.S. at 531.
Ioo. The Supreme Court in Tashire supported its conclusion with a single footnote referencing the
1968 ALl Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts, THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968) [here-
inafter ALl STUDY]. 386 U.S. at 531 n.7. Supporting Memorandum A to that study had regarded the
interpleader cases as the "authority closest in point" in upholding federal jurisdiction on the basis of
minimal diversity. ALI STUDY, supra, at 432-33. Like the Supporting Memorandum, however, Tashire
also referred to several other lines of authority in support of its endorsement of federal jurisdiction
based on minimal diversity. These included class actions in which the named class representative, but
not all members of the class, are of diverse citizenship from the defendant (see Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)), intervention of right by co-citizens of opposing parties (see Wich-
ita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 260 U.S. 48 (1922)), and the now-repealed provisions pro-
viding for removal of an entire action from state court provided it contained a "separable controversy"
or (as later amended), a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" falling within the diver-
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SCOPE OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Three theoretical approaches might support the aggregation in fed-
eral court of claims that fail to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of
Article III with those that do. Under a "delegation" approach, the Con-
stitution's conferral of federal judicial power over all "Cases" arising un-
der federal law, and "Controversies ... between Citizens of different
States"'' would be viewed as an implicit delegation to Congress of the
power to define the scope of such an arising under "Case" or diversity
"Controversy." Under that approach, the congressional determination
would not be subject to judicial review.
A second, less encompassing approach to the definition of an arising
under or diversity "Case" or "Controversy" would focus on the historic
bases for treating claims normally falling within the jurisdiction of the
English law courts at the time the Constitution was adopted as part of
single equitable "case" or "controversy" based on the inadequacy of the
legal remedy. Like the historic approach currently taken to the scope of
the Seventh Amendment jury trial right,' ° such an approach would ask
whether the Framers would have been familiar with analogous jurisdic-
tional shifts from one court system to another.
A third, more nuanced approach would focus, not on an assumed
implicit delegation to Congress or historical analogies, but rather on the
express delegation of power to Congress to enact measures "which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States."'' 3
Such an approach would focus on the relationship between claims clearly
falling within the jurisdiction conferred by Article III and the non-
jurisdictional claims that Congress seeks to include in the same case. If
the inclusion of the non-jurisdictional claims were "necessary and
proper" to permit the effective exercise of the jurisdiction expressly con-
ferred by the Constitution, federal jurisdiction over the claims would be
sustained.
sity jurisdiction (see American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S.
205 (i881)). Tashire, 386 U.S. at 531. The permissibility of exercising federal jurisdiction over non-
diverse parties in each of these contexts is examined separately below. See infra text accompanying
notes 237-41, 264-68, 328-47. As will be seen, they too stand for a far less expansive use of "minimal
diversity" as a basis for federal jurisdiction than proponents of the current jurisdiction expansion pro-
posals have supposed.
1OI. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. i.
102. See Chauffeurs, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (i99o); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417 (1987); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (959).
103. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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As discussed below, only the third model of federal jurisdiction pro-
vides a satisfactory approach to the issues posed by modem proposals to
enlarge the scope of federal jurisdiction. The first, "delegation" model
would threaten to destroy the careful allocation of judicial power be-
tween the federal and state governments prescribed by the Framers. The
second approach falters because no appropriate historic analogue corre-
sponds to the unique issues of federalism underlying the prescriptions of
Article III. The third approach closely ties the exercise of Article III ju-
risdiction with the purposes of the constitutional grant, and thus main-
tains the federal and state balance contemplated by the Framers. At the
same time, it gives appropriate weight to congressional findings of neces-
sity and historic understandings as to when the joinder of parties and
claims is appropriate to permit the exercise of the federal judicial func-
tion.
A. THE INADEQUACY OF AN UNRESTRICTED "DELEGATION" MODEL OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In its pathbreaking decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 4 the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded, in the context of pendent claim jurisdic-
tion, that a federal question claim and a non-diverse state law claim be-
tween the same parties arising out of a "common nucleus of operative
fact," formed part of the same constitutional arising-under "case."' 5 As
discussed below, the tendency of subsequent decisions and commenta-
tors has been to extend this holding to far more expansive assertions of
pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction to bring non-diverse state law
claims by and against additional parties within the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts-a development which deserves more careful scrutiny than it
has received 6 Some commentators have gone even further, however, by
suggesting that even Gibbs's "common nucleus of operative fact" con-
straint on the scope of federal jurisdiction is not constitutionally man-
dated. Rather, the scope of the federal arising-under "case" or diversity
"controversy" should be as broad as Congress or the rules drafters may
authorize in the rules for joinder of claims and parties adopted for the
federal courts."
104. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
105. Id. at 725.
1o6. See infra Part IV.C.
io7. See William A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set-Off. Be-
yond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 17i, 178 (1998); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitu-
tional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71
CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1409-10, 1463, 1477-90 (1983). See also Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Con-
solidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are What They Might Be, Part I: Justicia-
bility and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REv. 717, 741 (1995) (noting, but
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This approach, going beyond even the most expansive interpretation
of Gibbs, is unsatisfactory on a number of grounds. It would confer on
Congress and the rules drafters the power to extract vast domains of ju-
dicial power reserved by the Constitution to the states without any rela-
tionship to the heads of judicial power conferred by Article III. For
example, this analysis would permit the amendment of Rule 20 to au-
thorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims by or
against additional non-diverse litigants even though they were com-
pletely unrelated to a federal question or diversity claim properly as-
serted by or against other parties to the action. No apparent purpose
related to the limited grants of federal jurisdiction contained in Article
III would support such a jurisdictional regime, even on the dubious as-
sumption that it could be squared with Gibbs's very expansive approach
to the definition of an arising-under "Case," which was based predomi-
nantly on considerations of judicial economy.'" Such an approach would
be inconsistent with the strong suspicion of the federal judicial power
prevalent among many of the Framers,1' as well as with the language of
the Constitution itself. Article III confers federal judicial power over
"Cases" arising under federal law or "Controversies" between diverse
citizens. The question is not whether one claim between two parties to an
action reasonably meets this description, but whether the complete ag-
gregation of claims before the federal court-the entire "case" or "con-
troversy"-is such that it may reasonably be thought to arise under
federal law or to be between parties of diverse citizenship. Article III
does not extend federal jurisdiction to a litigative "unit ..... some part of
which arises under federal law or is between diverse citizens. Rather, Ar-
ticle III requires that a relationship exist between the jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional claims such that the entire case or controversy before
suggesting a more limited form of the theory); Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 55-61 (1987) (concluding that once a statutory basis for
jurisdiction over one of several originally asserted claims has been found, Congress should be held to
have delegated the power to define the scope of the entire "civil action" or "litigative unit," including
non-jurisdictional claims, to the Judiciary); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on
Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397, 448-49 (1976).
1o8. FED. R. CIv. P. 20.
io9. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724-26 (stating that the justification for supplemental jurisdiction "lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" and that "if, considered
without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding... there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole").
iIo. See RiCHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's: TilE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-9 (5th ed. 2003).
I 11. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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the federal court may fairly be viewed as falling within the scope of Arti-
cle 111. 12 The nature of that relationship is discussed further below.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF AN "HISTORIC" MODEL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
An historic approach to the definition of the federal arising-under
"case" or diversity "controversy" would look to analogous situations in
which, at the time of the framing of the Constitution, claims or contro-
versies normally within the cognizance of one system of English courts
might be adjudicated by another, based on a determination of the inade-
quacy of the remedy offered by the first. The most obvious analogue
would be the circumstances in which English courts of equity heard and
determined claims normally within the cognizance of the courts of law in
the late eighteenth century."3 The essence of the argument would be
that, in circumstances where the Framers would have been familiar with
treating otherwise legal claims as part of a single equitable "case" based
on the inadequacy of the remedy at law, it is permissible to aggregate
otherwise non-jurisdictional state law claims with diversity claims pend-
ing before a federal court based on a determination that state court proc-
esses are inadequate to resolve them. In the present context, the question
would be whether a "transactional" definition of a single equitable case
consolidating otherwise separate legal claims was established at the time
of the framing.
This approach to defining the scope of a federal arising under or di-
versity case is inadequate for two reasons. First, the "analogy" is not apt.
The division of power between the federal and state governments em-
bodied in the unique system of dual sovereignty established by the Con-
stitution finds no analogue in the contest for jurisdiction between
Chancery and the law courts in eighteenth century England."4 Considera-
tions of inadequate remedy that might support resort to the extraordi-
nary remedies provided by equity within a single sovereignty do not
suggest that a surrender of power to the courts of a different sovereign
was contemplated by the Framers, nor do they establish that such a juris-
dictional shift is necessary to provide effective remedies to litigants or to
permit the courts of either sovereign to perform the tasks assigned to
them by the Constitution.
112. This approach is consistent with recent scholarship recognizing that the scope of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction should be determined on a "claim specific" basis. See infra note 281.
113. The U.S. Supreme Court appeared to adopt such an approach in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
114. See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928) (noting that Parliament is concerned only with the distribution of its
internal judicial power a single sovereignty, not the relationship of Federal courts to those of the
states, which presents "a complication peculiar to a federated nation").
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In any event, the historic bases for the exercise of equity jurisdiction
in the late eighteenth century provide no clear support for current ex-
pansive proposals for enlarging federal jurisdiction based on "minimal
diversity" of citizenship or on a simple transactional relationship among
claims. It is true that equity did not follow the restrictive rules of the
common law on the joinder of claims and parties, so long as the bill was
not "multifarious," involving allegations of "distinct and independent
matters."'".5 But this liberal joinder practice generally proceeded on the
assumption that all of the claims to be joined properly were cognizable in
equity, rather than at law."6 Equity rules requiring the joinder of neces-
sary parties, permitting the intervention of third parties, and authorizing
proceedings by way of interpleader all were narrowly designed to permit
a court to render a complete and effective decree in the matter pending
before it without prejudicing the rights of third parties who possessed an
interest in the subject matter of the action. They were not based simply
on a transactional relationship among parties or claims."7 The historic
I15. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND INCIDENTS THEREOF, ACCORDING
TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 279 (9th ed. 1879).
116. JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES, 172 (5th ed. 1925) (Rule 26, Joinder
of Causes of Action) ("The plaintiff may join in one bill as many causes of action, cognizable in equity,
as he may have against the defendant.") (emphasis added); 3A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 18.03 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that, unlike earlier equity practice, early American codes
"united law and equity, thus allowing both legal and equitable relief to be obtained when related to
the same cause of action"); 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1581 (2d ed. 2001).
The treatment of the joinder of actions by the equity courts was much more flexible than
that accorded by the law courts. Generally, in a suit involving a single plaintiff and a single
defendant unlimited joinder was allowed and in a multiparty dispute the chancellors had
discretion to permit joinder whenever they believed it would be more convenient to settle
the entire controversy in one proceeding. Nonetheless, as long as law and equity were main-
tained as separate systems, it still was not possible to join a legal claim with an equitable
claim in either court.
Id. See also Stephen S. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922 & n.71 (1987) (citing HOPKINS, supra, at
172 (Rule 26)).
117. See HOPKINS, supra note 116, at 212 (Rule 37).
All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief de-
manded may join as plaintiffs, and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest adverse to the plaintiff .... Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at
any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention ....
Id.; James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention L The Right to Intervene and Reor-
ganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565-68 (1936) (discussing development of the right of intervention by those
possessing an interest in the subject matter of the action); id. at 576-77 (providing examples of inter-
ests supporting intervention); I JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As
ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REME-
DIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE § 114 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1881-83).
Pomeroy explained that
[t]he governing motive of equity in the administration of its remedial system is to grant full
relief, and to adjust in the one suit the rights and duties of all the parties, which really grow
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limitations of these procedures still are apparent in the current provisions
and application of Rules 19, 22, and 24."
The most closely analogous pre-framing procedure permitting the
joinder in equity of purely legal claims at the time the Constitution was
adopted was the class action. In his widely cited study, Professor Steven
Yeazell has chronicled the development of the class action in the English
Court of Chancery from the early 1700s through 185o, and has perceived
in that development the seeds of the modern class action based on a the-
ory of interest representation as somewhat imperfectly reflected in Rule
23."' Yeazell acknowledges that the English equity class action originally
arose to meet the needs of cohesive social groups, such as copyholder
tenants on a manor, and was based on a theory of express or implied
consent to representation rather than on interest representation alone. 2 '
But with the emergence of an industrial society, he finds group litigation
expanding beyond the limits of such pre-existing social groups and con-
out of or are connected with the subject-matter of that suit.... [AIlI persons in whose favor
or against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all persons who are so
interested, although indirectly, in the subject-matter and the relief granted, that their rights
or duties might be affected by the decree ... shall be made parties to the suit .... The pri-
mary object is, that all persons sufficiently interested may be before the court, so that the
relief may be properly adjusted among those entitled.., and all may be bound in respect
thereto by the single decree.
Id.; JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY, BY ENGLISH
BILL 144 (2d ed., 1795) ("[AII persons materially interested in the subject matter ought to be parties
to the suit."); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Proce-
dural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1271 (1961) (discussing the development of the rule in equity
that parties having an "interest" in a controversy be joined if feasible); id. at 1257 (providing illustra-
tive examples); 3 POMEROY, supra, § 1320 (noting that interpleader was proper "[w]here two or more
persons.., claim the same thing, debt, or duty by different or separate interests, from a third person");
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 8o6 (photo. reprint 1972) (1836) (stating
that interpleader is properly applied when "[t]wo or more persons claim the same thing by different or
separate interests from another person").
118. Federal Rule 19, for example, requires joinder of a party to an action if "the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may... impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." FED. R. Civ. P.
19. The Federal Interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2ooo), allows a plaintiff to join persons who
have claims against it, provided the "adverse claimants ... are claiming or may claim to be entitled to
such money or property" that has been deposited with the court. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 22. Federal
Rule 24 also reflects the existence of earlier interest requirements. Under Rule 24, parties have a right
to intervene "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action" and the applicant's ability to protect that interest will be impaired or impeded if
the applicant is not allowed to intervene. FED. R. COv. P. 24(a).
I 19. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I: The Industrialization of
Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 514-16 (198o) [hereinafter Yeazell I]; Stephen C. Yeazell,
From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV.
lO67, lO67-69 (I98O) [hereinafter Yeazell II].
120. See Yeazell I, supra note 1i19, at 517-18.
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cludes that by 1824 "[t]he group is on its way to becoming a class-not a
social organism but a number of individuals sharing some interest .... 
Accepting the general accuracy of this analysis does not establish
that class actions of the kind contemplated by the modem jurisdictional
expansion legislation -which predominantly are comprised of actions for
retrospective damages based on the defendant's tortious conduct in
which the class is affiliated only by the fact their injuries arose out of a
common course of wrongful conduct by the defendant-were recognized
by the Court of Chancery in England in the late eighteenth century, or
even in later times. The authorities cited by Yeazell proceeded on the as-
sumption that the plaintiff class was united by the assertion of a "com-
mon interest" or "general right" against the defendant, as illustrated by
cases in which the plaintiffs sued on behalf of all shareholders of a com-
pany to require the promoters to restore to the company funds that they
had wrongfully appropriated for themselves.' Yeazell criticizes the deci-
sions to the extent that they appear to rely on the presence of a common
interest or general right, as opposed to representation of interests. Nev-
ertheless, both the language of the decisions and the facts of the cases
show that the courts viewed the common or general nature of the right
involved, and not simply a theory of interest representation based on a
common factual or transactional relationship, to be crucial to the main-
tenance of the action.'23
121. Id. at 521.
122. See id. at 520-21 (discussing Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828)). See also id. at
535-38 (discussing Chancey v. May, 24 Eng. Rep. 2655 (Ch. 1722), which involved an action by owners
of the Temple Brass Works to require the former treasurers and managers of the company to account
for misapplications and embezzelments of its funds); id. at 541-44 (discussing Mayor of York v. Pilk-
ington, 26 Eng. Rep. 18o (Ch. 1737), in which the mayor of York sued riparian proprietors seeking to
establish title by prescription to fishing rights in a river; sustaining the action on the ground that the
plaintiff had asserted a "general right" against the defendants); id. at 544-47 (discussing Leigh v.
Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 2oi (Ch. 1751), in which agents purporting to be agents for the entire crew of a
vessel entitled to a share of prize money for a captured enemy ship were invited to sue on behalf of the
crew); id. at 547-48 (discussing Good v. Blewitt, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch. 18o7), in which the captain of a
privateer sued the owners for an accounting of captures on behalf of all seamen possessing an inter-
est); id. at 548-52 (discussing Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1154 (Ch. 18o5), in which a share-
holder entitled to rents from the operation of a water company was permitted to sue other
shareholders as a class claiming that his rents had been unlawfully diminished by the deduction of
taxes).
123. See FREDERIC CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY 38-
39 (1837) (noting that a class action was improper where those allegedly represented were not united
by a common interest, but had "several" demands and interests); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 193-94 (1950) (noting that where a tort had injured many persons, "[the]
older cases.., held that claims for damages by... numerous persons must be tried in separate actions




Difficulties under Rule 23 as originally promulgated in 1938,24 such
as in defining such terms as "joint" and "common" and in classifying ac-
tions as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious," led to comprehensive revision of
Rule 23 in the 1966 amendments. Unlike former practice, the results of
the "common question" class action under Rule 23(b)( 3)'
25 are intended
to bind the class as a result of the requirements for typicality and ade-
quate representation imposed by Rule 23(a) , 6 and for notice to the class
members and opportunity to opt out accorded by Rule 23(c) in all ac-
tions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)."7 Yeazell's theory of interest repre-
[i]n the multiplicity of suits cases, it was important that all the issues necessary to determin-
ing the legal right in each suit at law were shared in common. In other words, it was impor-
tant that all suits involved an identical legal right, not just common issues. Equity took
jurisdiction to declare that single legal right once and for all.
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 237 (1990). In his view, Yeazell failed to account for the fact that
the concept of representation in the Eighteenth Century in England did not relate to the representa-
tion of interests with a view to binding absent class members. Rather "[olne lawsuit was 'representa-
tive' of others when it was like those others because it implicated the same abstract configuration of
legal rights and duties." Id. at 242. This followed from the fact that the class action in the Eighteenth
Century was conceived of, not as a device to bind absent class members as it is today (and as is con-
templated by the pending jurisdictional reform proposals), but rather as a response to the demands of
the necessary parties rule, permitting suits to proceed to decision when it was impractical to join all
interested parties. Id. at 246-47. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1858, 1878, 1882-85 (1998). In English equity, all
persons with an "interest in the subject matter of the suit" had to be joined. Bone, supra, at 246-47.
This did not refer to goals or litigation objectives ascribed to litigants, but rather to "formal relation-
ships among pre-existing rights and duties that made all such rights and duties part of the same legal
dispute warranting a single remedy." Id. at 247. The modem conception of the binding effect of a class
judgment based on adequate representation of interests found its first clear expression in Hansberry v.
Lee, 3t1 U.S. 32,42-43 (940).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938) and advisory committee's note to the 1938 rule. See generally 3B
MooRE, supra note 1 16, ch.23.
125. Rule 23(b)(3) allows an action to be brought as a class action if
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class pre-
dominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
126. Rule 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (i) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
127. Rule 23 (c)(2)-(3) provide:
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sentation as a basis for binding class treatment thus now has been par-
tially realized-subject to the requirement for implicit "consent" as a re-
sult of the right to opt out-in modern Rule 23. That realization,
however, was widely viewed as an innovation in 1966, particularly in re-
spect to the binding effect of the common question class action certified
under current Rule 23(b)(3)' That development undercuts any claim
that modem jurisdiction expansion proposals aggregating state court
claims not independently falling within the scope of Article III with
pending or prospective federal proceedings simply on the basis of a
transactional relationship among them can be justified by historic anal-
ogy to the definition of a single equitable "controversy" in England at
the time the Constitution was adopted. Yeazell discerns the seeds of an
interest representation theory of class actions in Calvert's treatise on eq-
uity published in I837.29 However, he recognizes that the implications of
this "shiny new rationale" for group litigation never were realized in
England. Instead, group litigation in England "went into a deep slumber
lasting a century, a slumber from which it has never awakened in Eng-
land," and "in the United States it has been stirred into awareness only in
the last few decades.'
3
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individ-
ual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the mem-
ber so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request ex-
clusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel. (3) The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(i) or (b)(2), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members
of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)-(3).
128. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999) (noting that although Rule 23 as
amended in 1966 was crafted "in general, practical terms, without the formalism that had bedeviled the
original Rule 23," the Advisory Committee particularly anticipated "innovations under Rule
23(b)(3)"); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390 (1967) ("cases which will pass through the
screen of (b)(3) and qualify as class actions are not simply the spurious cases of former rule 23 with a
discreet suppression of the old soubriquet"); id. at 396-97 ("The entire regulation of (b)( 3 ) cases
should be seen in contrast to the previous practice .... [T]he new pattern is preferable.").
New rule 23 alters the pattern of class actions; subdivision (b)(3), in particular, is a new
category deliberately created. Like other innovations from time to time introduced into the
Civil Rules, those as to class actions change the total situation on which the statutes and
theories regarding subject matter jurisdiction are brought to bear.
Id. at 399-400.
129. See Yeazell II, supra note i 19 at iO8o-85 (discussing CALVERT, supra note 123).
130. Yeazell II, supra note i 9, at IO84-85. See also Yeazell I, supra note I i9, at 535-38 (perceiv-
ing an underlying interest representation basis for the decision in Chancey v. May, 24 Eng. Rep. 265
[Vol. 55:613
MINIMAL DIVERSITY
C. LIMITS ON THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: A "NECESSARY AND
PROPER" MODEL
Entirely apart from historic analogies, rules permitting the joinder of
diverse and non-diverse state-law claims in a single action might be justi-
fied as a permissible exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to implement the authority conferred on Congress to define and
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3 ' If the traditionally expansive
(Ch. 1722), but recognizing that "[t]he last two hundred years of group litigation have been an attempt
to come to terms with the possibilities thus posed; but Chancey did not do so. Instead, having reached
such a daring theoretical position -without an explicit formulation of it-Chancery retreated to ram-
bling confusing and groping rigidity for the remainder of the eighteenth century.").
Reliance on eighteenth century bills of peace as a device for avoiding a multiplicity of litigation
also provides no clear historic foundation for the broad intersystem consolidation of jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional claims contemplated by current reform proposals. In more recent times, Professor
Zechariah Chafee advocated broad use of bills of peace to avoid multiple suits raising common issues
of law or fact (see CHAFFEE, supra note 123, at 153-57, 161), but this position lacked any clear ground-
ing in historic equity practice. Rather, as in historic class action practice, the existence of privity or
some "common" or "general" right was required as the basis for a bill of peace. As Pomeroy recog-
nized- even while strenuously advocating broader use of the bill of peace where the only thing uniting
litigants was an interest in the "common questions" presented by their actions -historically
there does and must exist among the individuals composing the numerous body, or between
each of them and their single adversary, a common right, a community of interest in the sub-
ject-matter of the controversy, or a common title from which all their separate claims and all
the questions at issue arise; it is not enough that the claims of each individual being separate
and distinct, there is a community of interest merely in the question of law or of fact in-
volved, or in the kind and form of remedy demanded and obtained by or against each indi-
vidual.
I POMEROY, supra note 117, § 268 (emphasis in original). Pomeroy himself acknowledged that there
was no clear historic precedent for his views: "when we inquire, what is the exact extent of this doc-
trine, in what kinds and classes of cases is a court of equity empowered to exercise its jurisdiction and
administer reliefs, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, we shall find not only a remarkable uncer-
tainty and incompleteness in the judicial utterances, but even a direct conflict of decisions." Id. § 244.
Similarly, Chafee, despite advocating a more liberal approach, recognized that in the early English
cases, more than an interest in common questions of law and fact was required. Usually a "community
of property interest (or privity)" was required. CHAFEE, supra note 123, at 161. "It is certain that the
early cases used it [community of interest] to mean only a community of property interest in the sub-
ject matter of the controversy, such as in the manorial common or the parish tithes." Id. at 172. See
also, POMEROY, supra note 17, § 268 (stating that examples of this rule are "instances of controversies
between the lord of a manor and his tenants concerning some general right claimed by or against them
all arising from the custom of the manor, or between a parson and his parishioners concerning tithes or
a modus affecting all"). Even more recently, a significant conflict of authority existed on whether
common questions of law or fact were sufficient to support an equitable bill of peace. See Tribbette v.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 12 So. 32,32 (1892); see also CrHAFEE, supra note 123, at 17o-83.
131. Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not limited to implementation
of the powers enumerated in Article I, but extends to those conferred by other provisions of the Con-
stitution, including its power to create lower federal courts and to define, within constitutional limits,
their jurisdiction, conferred by Article III. See, e.g., Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 590 (I949); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW § 3.3 (6th ed.
2000); David E. Engdahi, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999
BYU L. REv. 75, 100-05 (1999); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Con-
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interpretation of the scope of congressional authority under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause were to be applied in this area, it would be suffi-
cient if any conceivable rational basis could support the exercise of
congressional power to expand federal jurisdiction in light of the pur-
poses of Article III's grant of jurisdiction over "Controversies . .. be-
tween Citizens of different States.' 32 Under McCulloch v. Maryland,1
33
the Necessary and Proper Clause is broadly interpreted to permit Con-
gress to adopt any appropriate means to achieve the objectives embraced
by the powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution. "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional."'34 The Court made clear that the clause should be in-
terpreted to expand, not to contract, the scope of the enumerated pow-
ers, and should be broadly applied to permit the national government to
attain its legitimate objectives.' Rejecting any strict construction of
"necessary," the Court made clear that if the end was permissible, the
choice of means to achieve that end was, within the limits of rational
choice, for Congress rather than the judiciary., 6 McCulloch has come to
stand for the proposition that the "test for validity of a federal act is
whether the Congress might reasonably find that the act relates to one of
the federal powers. If the act arguably relates to such an end, then it is
valid so long as it does not violate a specific check on governmental ac-
tion such as those contained in the Bill of Rights.'
' 37
Even under this traditional interpretation of McCulloch, the powers
of Congress are not unlimited. Chief Justice Marshall himself made clear
that the Court must perceive that congressional action is directed to the
achievement of a permissible end, within the contemplation of the enu-
merated powers, and that "should congress, under the pretext of execut-
ing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted
to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribu-
trol the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 45,46-52 (I975);.
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 7.
133. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (18i9) (Marshall, C.J.).
134. Id. at 421.
135. Specifically, Marshall stated:
Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the [national] govern-
ment. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. No
reason has been, or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discre-
tion of the national legislature under words which purport to enlarge it.
Id. at 420.
136. Id. at 414-18.
137. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 131, §3.3.
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nal ... to say that such an act was not the law of the land."'' 3 As devel-
oped below, this observation is very much in point with respect to signifi-
cant aspects of the enacted and proposed "minimal diversity" jurisdiction
expansion legislation, which are directed to the attainment of objects un-
related the purposes of the Diversity Clause that they purport to imple-
ment.'39
More importantly, the pending federal jurisdiction expansion pro-
posals involve a fundamental alteration of the federal state balance
through the abrogation of long-standing rules limiting the diversity juris-
diction of the federal courts, as well as established rules governing the
mandatory joinder of parties and claims. 4° In similar contexts, recent de-
cisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have signaled what Professor Vicki
Jackson aptly has termed a "reinvigoration of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a deliberation-forcing check on impetuous federal legisla-
tion..'.' This development has taken root in several distinct but interre-
lated lines of modern Supreme Court authority whose unifying theme is
preservation of the values of federalism and the independent and
autonomous roles of state institutions in our system of dual sovereignty.
One of these lines finds its origins in United States v. Lopez,' in
which the Court, for the first time in recent history, invalidated an exer-
cise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause on the ground
that Congress had not demonstrated a sufficient connection between the
activity regulated and interstate commerce.'43 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for a five-member majority striking down the provision was
predicated on a more rigorous review of both congressional means and
ends than traditional necessary and proper analysis would have im-
plied.'" As to means, the Court emphasized that regulation of local ac-
tivities on the ground that they affect interstate commerce must be based
on "substantial" rather than "trivial" effects.' 5 While denying the neces-
sity for legislative findings to sustain every commerce clause enactment,
the Court placed heavy weight on the absence of any findings establish-
138. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
139. See infra Parts IV.A.-B.
140. See supra Part I.
141. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, iii
HARv. L. REV. 218o, 2236 (I998).
142. 514 U.S. 549 (1995)-
143. At issue was the provision of the Gun Free School Zones Act prohibiting the knowing posses-
sion of a firearm within a school zone, defined as consisting of the grounds of a public, private, or pa-
rochial school and a iooo-feet surrounding zone. Id. at 551, 551 n.i.
144. As to ends, the Court restricted the Commerce power to regulation of the channels or instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, of persons or things moving in interstate commerce, and of "eco-
nomic" activities that could be found "substantially affect, interstate commerce." Id. at 558-6o.
145. Id. at 556-57.
February 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ing a clear tie between the regulated activity and interstate commerce in
the case at bar., 6 The Chief Justice's opinion emphasized that judicially
enforceable limits on the commerce power must exist to preserve our
"dual system of government."'47
The willingness of the majority in Lopez to engage in enhanced re-
view of the connection between congressional means and ends has found
even stronger expression where federal legislation is aimed directly at the
functioning of the institutions of state governments. Most prominently,
despite the established principle that Congress has the power to override
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the exercise of its power
to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment under the coun-
terpart of the Necessary and Proper Clause found in Section 5 of that
Amendment,"" the Court, building on its decision in City of Boerne v.
146. Id. at 562-63.
147. Id. at 557. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2ooo), the Court applied Lopez in con-
cluding that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. Unlike Lopez, the congressional record in Morrison was replete with congressional
findings that the conduct prohibited had a significant effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 614 ("In
contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by nu-
merous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their
families."). The Court held these findings insufficient, however, because they relied on an "attenu-
ated" chain of "but for" causation, running from the alleged effect that gender-motivated violence had
on its victims to decreased national productivity and increased medical and other costs, to decreased
supply and demand for interstate products. Id. at 615. This reasoning "seeks to follow the but-for
causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been the
prime object of the States' police power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce." Id.
That approach would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated im-
pact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption,"
impermissibly altering the federal-state balance by eliminating the distinction between "what is truly
national and what is truly local." Id. at 615, 617-18. Morrison, with considerable justification, has been
subjected to energetic criticism for the Court's failure to defer to the extensive congressional findings
before it. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the
Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 109-97 (2oo2); Susan Herman, Splitting the
Atom of Marshall's Wisdom, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371, 377-81 (2001); Marianne Moody
Jennings & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights
and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Perspec-
tive, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2ooo); Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federal-
ism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. I (2ooo). Nevertheless, the decision undoubtedly demonstrates the
Court's willingness to scrutinize closely the connection between congressional ends and means in cases
involving significant intrusions on areas of traditional state responsibility.
148. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
650 (1966) (holding that "[b]y including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 209-IO (1970) (citing Katzen-
bach, 384 U.S. 641).
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Flores,149 has invalidated a number of important civil rights statutes inso-
far as they sought to subject the states to suit in federal court. In such
cases, the Court concluded that the legislative record failed to establish a
sufficient connection between identified Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tions by the States and the remedies that Congress had prescribed.5°
In a third line of cases, the Court has relied on the Tenth Amend-
ment in invalidating congressional legislation that it viewed as an undue
impairment of the retained sovereign authority and functions of the
states. In New York v. United States,' the Court invalidated the "take ti-
tle" provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act on the
ground that they, in effect, either required the states to accept ownership
of the waste or to regulate according to the instructions of Congress. The
principle of retained state sovereignty was violated by legislation that
sought to "'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by di-
149. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 on
the ground that rather than "enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, it sought to rede-
fine the prohibitions of the Amendment itself).
i5o. In Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2ooo), for example, the Court struck down
that aspect of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under a test, derived from Boerne, that re-
quires Congress, in order to override the states' immunity from suit in federal court, to establish the
existence both of a "pattern" of state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment, and a "congru-
ence and proportionality" between those violations and the remedies adopted. Id. at 82-92. The ma-
jority closely examined the legislative record to determine whether override of the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity was an appropriate remedial measure. That examination revealed that the ex-
tension of the Act's enforcement provisions to the States "was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem" because "Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation." Id.
at 89. Findings of age discrimination by the private sector did not extend to the states, and Congress
had no reason to believe that states were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on
the basis of age. "In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the
lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the
ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 91.
The Court's close scrutiny of congressional means and ends continued in Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2O 1), which invalidated the provision of the Americans
with Disabilities Act subjecting the States' to suit in federal court. Rejecting the argument of the dis-
senters that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be broadly construed and that congres-
sional legislation should be sustained if the Court could discern any conceivable state of facts upon
which Congress might have acted, the majority concluded that the legislative record and findings were
insufficient. Id. at 383-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To sustain an abrogation of the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the Court was required to "identify with some precision the scope of the con-
stitutional right at issue" and then to determine whether Congress had identified a pattern of state
violations of that right and whether the remedy adopted was "congruent and proportional" to the
identified violations. Id. at 365, 374. See also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627. 643-45.(999). The Court has grounded these restrictive Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power decisions explicitly on the need to preserve the independent func-
tions, autonomy, and dignity of state governments and their institutions in our federal system of gov-
ernment.
15I, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram." '52 Very much in point in the present context, the Court noted that
such measures are "typically the produce of the era's perceived necessity"
but the federal structure "protects us from our own best intentions" by
"dividing power among sovereigns and among branches precisely so that
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day."' 53
Finally, in Alden v. Maine,'54 the Court drew upon strands of its new
federalism jurisprudence derived from both its Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment decisions to hold that Congress lacked the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to subject States to suit in their own courts for viola-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Once again, the principle of the
States' "residuary and inviolable sovereignty" was determinative. The
anti-"commandeering" principle of New York applied equally to the
State's judicial as to its legislative and executive branches, because
"'[T]he Constitution. . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and in-
dependence of the States- independence in their legislative and independ-
ence in their judicial departments."55
Of course, these modern federalism decisions do not speak directly
to the problem at hand. Proposals expanding federal subject matter ju-
risdiction based on the existence of minimal diversity between any two
152. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(i98i)). Reviewing the history of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the Framers explicitly
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress "the power to regulate individuals, not States." Id. at
166. A contrary result would obscure lines of responsibility and political accountability of state gov-
ernments to their electorates and impermissibly impair the retained sovereignty of the states. Main-
taining the proper division of authority between federal and state governments was essential for the
"protection of individuals" because "States sovereignty is not just an end in itself." Id. at 181. Rather,
maintaining a "healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(i99s)). Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997), the Court applied the same rationale in
invalidating the provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring, on an interim
basis, state chief law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on the purchasers of hand-
guns. The Court refused to confine New York to the "commandeering" of state legislative action in-
volving the determination of policy, but concluded that the anti-"commandeering" principle it had
announced was equally applicable to state executive action. Id. at 927-33. The Court rejected the ar-
gument that the regulation at issue was justified under the Necessary and proper Clause, on the
ground that
when a "La[w] ... for carrying into Execution" the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned
earlier.., it is not a "La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,"
and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, "merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "de-
serve[s] to be treated as such."
Id. at 923-24 (first alteration added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)).
153. New York, 505 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
154. 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999).
I55. Id. at 754 (emphasis added) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78-79 (938)).
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adverse parties and some sort of transactional relationship between di-
verse and non-diverse claims do not subject the states themselves to suit
in federal or state court, or direct the functioning of state legislative, ex-
ecutive, or judicial officers, or supersede or supplement state legislative
authority through expansive federal legislation reaching matters histori-
cally regulated by the States. In their broader implications, however, the
Court's recent federalism decisions articulate themes and rest on princi-
ples that call for closer analysis of the enacted and proposed federal ju-
risdiction expansion legislation than has been supposed. Those decisions
assume that legislation significantly altering the balance of authority be-
tween the federal and state governments-whether in their legislative,
executive, or judicial departments-should receive somewhat closer scru-
tiny than the traditional "conceivable rationality" standard would entail.
In particular, the Court has closely examined the record and findings un-
derlying the legislation in question to determine whether the ends sought
by Congress are legitimate, and whether, assuming they are, a sufficiently
close connection between the achievement of those ends and the means
chosen either is apparent or is demonstrated by the legislative record it-
self.' 56 Additionally, the Court has not hesitated to strike down congres-
sional legislation that, although arguably connected to legitimate ends,
employs means that sweep significantly beyond what would be necessary
to achieve those purposes.'57
The Court's recent federalism decisions and their more stringent
standard of review have been subject to widespread and justified criti-
cism.' 8 Particularly in its chary treatment of legislative findings, the
Court has intruded unduly on the constitutional role and institutional
competence of Congress. Nevertheless, shorn of their more extreme im-
plications, those decisions reflect a justifiable concern that significant al-
terations in the federal/state balance not be grounded on imaginary or
hypothetical suppositions, but rather on real and substantial problems
demonstrably implicating the underlying purposes of the federal power
156. See supra notes 142-5o and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 15o and accompanying text.
i58. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, III YALE L.J. 1141, 1141-44
(2002); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, i1 MICH. L. REV. 8o (2002); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV 367, 371-73 (2002); Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. IO45, 1045-6I
(2ooi); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, ioo
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2oo0); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Maine's Sovereignty, Alden's Federalism,
and the Myth of Absolute Principles: The Newest Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 33 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 325, 326-34 (2000); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849,850-53 (1999).
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at issue. ' One of the ironies of the hearings and debates on the "minimal
diversity" proposals has been the general assumption that the clear im-
pairment of the values of federalism that they entail raises only questions
of policy, rather than any constitutional concern. The need to confine the
diversity jurisdiction to its intended scope, however, is not simply a mat-
ter of policy. The very existence of the lower federal courts was a matter
of intense debate when the Constitution was adopted precisely because
of the displacement of state judicial authority that their creation would
involve.' These concerns led to the Madisonian compromise which em-
powered Congress to determine whether to create the lower federal
courts, and, by implication to define their jurisdiction. 6' However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the question is not entirely entrusted
to the political branches, and has held that Congress may not expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the limits of Article 111.,62 That
limit was imposed expressly to protect the role of the state courts in our
constitutional structure.' 63 If, as Alden recognizes, a direction to state
courts to entertain cases against the state that could not be entertained in
federal court represents an undue interference with the reserved judicial
power of the state,6 4 an unprecedented expansion of federal jurisdiction
under the Diversity Clause that threatens to deprive the state courts of
authority to resolve cases that lie at the historic core of the judicial power
reserved to them by the Constitution deserve no less demanding review.
Such "reinvigorated" necessary and proper review would require ei-
ther that Congress articulate the connection between legitimate ends and
permissible means or that such a connection be apparent to the court.
Such review would protect the interests of federalism while avoiding
placing impenetrable barriers to Congress's enlargement of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction where the purposes of the Diversity Clause or
159. As Professor Vicki Jackson has argued, achieving this result does not require the Court to
endorse substantive state "enclaves" of authority, or necessarily imply any normative valuation of the
relative federal and state interests at stake. Jackson, supra note 141, at 2240 (advocating adoption of a
"clear evidence/clear statement" requirement). Instead, "[r]equiring Congress to explain itself-to
justify the basis for federal regulation in areas not previously regulated at the federal level and not
obviously within an enumerated power-may help it to do its job better by forcing it to be more
thoughtful about whether a national law is the appropriate solution." Id. These observations also are
pertinent to a massive transfer of judicial power from the state to the federal judiciaries, contrary to
the prevalent allocation of judicial power that has held sway for over two hundred years.
16o. FALLON, supra note i Io, at 7-9, 19-27.
161. Id. at 8.
162. See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 607 (I949) (plurality opinion)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 626 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
163. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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other heads of federal judicial power would be served. Such a process-
based inquiry would permit the Court to "monitor federal legislation on
federalism grounds" by focusing on "connections to enumerated powers
and on demonstrated need for federal involvement," and would avoid
the necessity for the Court to "substitut[e] is own judgment of the 'de-
gree of necessity' once it is clear Congress has made a reasoned and rea-
sonable judgment.' ' 6, Courts should not strain to supply, ex post, some
"conceivable" rationale that possibly might have led Congress to enact
the proposed legislation to achieve the purposes of the Diversity Clause,
no how attenuated it might be and without any evidence that Congress
shared that objective. To do so would undermine the special competence
of Congress to assemble and evaluate facts bearing on whether the pur-
poses of the Diversity Clause are implicated, as well as its political re-
sponsibility to determine whether such a significant alteration of the
federal/state balance is warranted to achieve those ends.
A moderately demanding necessary and proper review along the
suggested line would not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision in Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina,'66 in which the
Court sustained the provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
tolling the statute of limitations for state law claims originally filed in
federal court over which the court later declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.i Rejecting any test of "absolute necessity," the Court up-
held that provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause on two
grounds: first, on the ground that it contributed to the fair and efficient
operation of the federal courts by eliminating "the unsatisfactory options
that federal judges faced when they decided whether to retain jurisdic-
tion over supplemental state-law claims that might be time-barred in
State court,"' and second, because it removed a "serious impediment to
access to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing federal- and
state-law claims in federal court under the supplemental jurisdiction doc-
trine.
,69
In contrast to the statute in Jinks, the enacted and pending proposals
for expansion of federal jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity, in
many of their applications, raise substantial questions both of validity
165. Jackson, supra note 141, at 2242.
166. 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1669 (2oo3).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000) (tolling state statute of limitations for the time during which
the claim was pending in federal court and an additional period of thirty days).
168. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1671 (those options included retaining jurisdiction contrary to the evident
statutory policy, conditionally dismissing the claim on waiver of the statue of limitations defense,
which might be refused, or the cumbersome route of outright dismissal with leave to refile if the claim




and appropriateness. Unlike Jinks, they authorize the federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims in circumstances
where that is not necessary to permit the federal courts fairly and effi-
ciently to dispose of cases properly pending before them. Moreover, as
discussed further below, the ends that Congress sought to achieve fre-
quently bear little or no relationship to the purposes of the Diversity
Clause. And, where legitimate ends are identified, the means employed
frequently have no apparent connection to those ends, or sweep far be-
yond what would be necessary to achieve them.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED EXPANSIONS OF FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
A. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
i. Questionable Objectives
As the class action jurisdiction act has progressed through various
versions over the years, its proponents have articulated a variety of ob-
jectives to support its enactment. A good many of these have very little
to do with the core objectives of the Diversity Clause, which is focused
on protecting out-of-state litigants from prejudice in local courts. Rather,
they explicitly rest on a distrust of the competence and fairness of state
courts in general-a view that would have surprised the Framers of the
Constitution. As previously discussed,'70 the bills have sought to combat
alleged "collusive settlements" negotiated by class counsel in state court
actions, in which defendants purchase peace by providing large fees to
class counsel and inadequate rewards to class members. State courts
were alleged to have provided inadequate scrutiny of such settlements.
Moreover, state courts were alleged to possess inadequate resources to
handle complex litigation. Additionally, they were thought to lack the
ability to aggregate multiple proceedings arising out of a single transac-
tion, preventing fair, consistent, and efficient adjudication. Standing
alone, these justifications fail to bring the proposed legislation within the
purposes of the diversity jurisdiction. The conventional justification for
that clause-the prevention of bias against out-of-state litigants-does
not address alleged inadequacies and inefficiencies in the state courts in
general, but rather bias against out-of-state litigants in those courts.'
7'
170. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94.
171. Thus was the only justification for the diversity jurisdiction articulated by Hamilton in his de-
fense of the Diversity Clause of Article III in the Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 114
(Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing Co.) (1937) (ascribing the diversity jurisdiction to the need
for "tribunal[s] which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different




In-depth consideration of the use of "minimal diversity" as a basis
for federal court jurisdiction can be traced to the ALI's 1968 Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, conducted
under the distinguished supervision of Richard H. Field as Chief Re-
porter, and Paul J. Mishkin and Charles Allen Wright as Reporters.'72
Unlike the current enactments and proposals, that Study recognized the
need to adhere closely to the purposes of the Diversity Clause in fashion-
ing its proposals for revision of federal court jurisdiction. The Study's
central recommendation regarding the general diversity jurisdiction was
to eliminate the possibility that it might be invoked, as an original matter,
by an in-state citizen. Such jurisdiction was "not responsive to any ac-
ceptable justification for diversity jurisdiction. The in-stater can hardly
be heard to ask the federal government to spare him from litigation in
the courts of his own state. Any prejudice which he may fear is not of the
kind against which the diversity jurisdiction was intended to protect.'
' 73
In making this recommendation, the Study concluded that access to
federal courts based on diversity of citizenship should be permitted only
upon a showing of "strong reasons therefor.' ' 74 That was because "[s]o
long as federal courts continue to decide cases arising under state law
without the possibility of state review, the state's judicial power is less ex-
tensive than its legislative power; this is an undesirable interference with
state autonomy.' 75 Very much in point in the present context, the Study
emphasized that its proposals "relate to the distribution of power be-
tween federal and state judicial systems" and to "'basic principles of fed-
eralism. ' '', 76 Even if federal courts were assumed to be "better" in some
sense than those of the states, "this would not justify taking away from
the state courts cases arising under state law that are properly the busi-
ness of the states.' 77
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as im-
partially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the
constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indul-
gence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribu-
nals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of
different states.
Id.
172. ALI STUDY, supra note too.
173. Id. at 124.
174. Id. at 99.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 1oo. The Study's basic proposal limiting the invocation of diversity jurisdiction by "in-
staters" was accompanied by a variety of subsidiary proposals dealing with such matters as the defini-
tion of corporate and associational citizenship, all designed to tailor and limit the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction to cases in which its core purpose would be served. See id. §13ol(b), (e); id. at 112-19,
121-23. Of particular interest were the recommendations assimilating unincorporated associations to
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Most pertinent to the present topic was the Study's separate pro-
posal of a new "head" of federal jurisdiction in multiparty, multistate
cases based on the existence of minimal diversity of citizenship where
"one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other is a
citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdiction."'' 8 In resting this
grant of jurisdiction in multistate, multiparty cases on the existence of
minimal diversity, the Study foreshadowed both the Multiparty, Multifo-
rum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 and the current class action proposals.
Moreover, the Study's analysis of the constitutionality of federal jurisdic-
tion based on minimal diversity clearly underlies the present confident
but unelaborated assertions that these proposals raise no constitutional
difficulties.'79 On closer examination, however, the Study's recommenda-
tion provides little support for the current, more expansive enactments
and proposals. To the contrary, its carefully limited scope and close at-
tention to the purposes of the Diversity Clause contradicts some of the
most basic premises on which they are based.
In contrast to the current enactments and proposals, the Study em-
phasized that because its proposal represented a significant transfer of
power from state to federal courts, it required a greater justification than
either judicial economy or distrust of the competence and fairness of
state courts could provide.'8° "[T]he simple fact that more cases might be
the treatment of corporations by treating them as citizens of the principal place of business regardless
of the citizenship of their members. The Study justified this recommendation specifically on the
ground that "complete diversity" between all adverse parties was not a constitutional requirement. Id.
at 116. The Study also authorized non-diverse claims by or on behalf of family members residing the
same household as a federal diversity plaintiff to be joined in the same action, provided they arose out
of the same transaction as the diversity claims on the ground that such joinder would promote sound
judicial administration. id. § 1301(e); id. at 121-23. And, while adhering to existing law limiting re-
moval based on diversity of citizenship to a defendant who was not a citizen of the state from which
removal was sought, the Study recommended dispensing with the requirement that all defendants join
in the petition for removal and would have permitted removal of an entire action by an out-of-state
defendant diverse from one plaintiff even though the action involved claims against non-diverse de-
fendants as well or included some plaintiffs not diverse from the defendant. Id. § 1304. This recom-
mendation was thought to serve the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction because the joinder of non-
diverse plaintiffs or defendants would not serve to prevent prejudice against an out-of-state defen-
dant-at least in cases involving "several" claims. "It is nevertheless true that, regardless of the plain-
tiffs purpose, when an out-of-stater is joined with a resident defendant in a case involving several
liability or liability in the alternative, he is subject to the risk of local bias to as great a degree as if he
were sued alone by an in-state plaintiff." Id. at 144. In all of these respects, the Study obviously pro-
ceeded on the assumption that "minimal" diversity satisfied constitutional requirements in the specific
contexts with which it dealt.
178. Id. § 2371(a).
179. See id. at 387-88, app. A. The Study's analysis of the minimal diversity issue provided one
basis for the Supreme Court's conclusion in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31
(1967), that the federal interpleader statute authorizing federal interpleader where any two adverse
claimants are of diverse citizenship is constitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
i8o. ALl STUDY supra note Ioo, at 375-79.
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better-or more efficiently- tried in federal court is not itself sufficient
justification for such jurisdiction. The problems involved here do not re-
late simply to trial efficiency at large, but grow out of the multistate na-
ture of our Union and hence present a special basis for federal
intervention."
8'
For this reason, the Study's authorization of federal jurisdiction
based on minimal diversity in multistate, multiparty cases was strictly
limited to cases that satisfied two very demanding requirements, neither
of which circumscribes the current proposals for federal jurisdiction ex-
pansion. Specifically, federal jurisdiction on that basis would have been
authorized only where (i) "several defendants who are necessary for a
just adjudication of the plaintiffs claim" were (2) "not all amenable to
process of any one territorial jurisdiction.'I,8 The proposal was thus based
on the necessity for a federal court to hear intertwined state law claims to
permit it to resolve a diversity claim properly before it, not on broadly
defined judicial economy objectives or mistrust of state courts. It would
have permitted the origination in or removal to federal court of complex
litigation only where no state was capable of joining all of the parties
necessary to the just resolution of a federal plaintiff's diversity claim.5 3
The commentary repeatedly emphasized this central point. The re-
quirement that the non-diverse parties be "necessary for a just adjudica-
tion" was "intended to express that degree of urgency for the presence of
scattered parties which goes beyond trial efficiency and economy, and in-
volves further elements relating to the adequacy or fairness of a disposition
made in the absence of particular parties. "84
The Study also recognized that the historic purposes of the diversity
clause might be more broadly viewed as including the promotion of in-
terstate commercial intercourse by assuring litigants -particularly busi-
ness enterprises-that they may conduct business "away from home"
181. Id. at 378.
182. Id. § 2371(a) (emphasis added).
183. Under the Report's recommendation, a defendant was
necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff claims... if complete relief cannot be ac-
corded the plaintiff in his absence, or if it appears that, under federal law or relevant State
law, an action on the claim would have to be dismissed if he could not be joined as a party,
invoking concepts of "necessary" or "indispensable" parties akin to those of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19. Id. § 237I(b). The Study made clear that "[plersons against whom several liability is as-
serted shall not be deemed necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim because liability is
asserted against them jointly or alternatively as well." Id.
184. Id. at 385 (emphasis added). The Study pointed out that however justified a complete diver-
sity requirement might be as a general matter, in the specific context at issue "it would operate... to
deny an effective forum in many multistate cases" because it would exclude cases in which a plaintiff
wished to sue defendants only some of which were diverse from a federal forum "even though no
other court could provide a just adjudication of the action." Id. at 387.
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with assurance that they will have access to an adequate and impartial fo-
rum for the resolution of any disputes that may arise.'P5 One of the main
arguments for the interstate class action jurisdiction act seems to relate to
this concern, but in this respect it paints with too broad a brush. Propo-
nents of the legislation have argued that what they term "interstate class
actions" "typically affect more citizens, involve more money, and impli-
cate more interstate commerce issues than any other type of lawsuit" and
fall within the rationale of the diversity jurisdiction for that reason.16
But, putting aside the fact that the term "interstate class actions" is a
somewhat misleading description of the range of cases covered by the
proposed legislation-which encompasses any class action in which any
class member is of diverse citizenship from any defendant-this claim
does not withstand analysis. The fact that litigation may involve large
numbers of parties, or a large sum of money, or have "interstate com-
merce ramifications" does not, standing alone, bring it within the ration-
ale of the diversity jurisdiction. Litigation entirely between citizens of a
single state may involve many parties, much money, and have enormous
implications for interstate commerce. Of course, the impact of such non-
federal cases on interstate commerce might provide a basis for congres-
sional regulation or preemption of state law under the Commerce
Clause.' But so long as Congress has not addressed those "ramifica-
tions" by substantive legislation, they remain within the legislative and
judicial power of the States.18
The claims of the proponents of the proposed class action legislation
would come within the rationale of the diversity jurisdiction only if its
provisions were addressed to the prospect of discrimination against out-
of-state litigants, or the deterrence of commercial intercourse among the
states because out-of state business enterprises might fear subjecting
themselves to litigation in the courts of the foreign States. As discussed
below, the provisions of the class action legislation are not well crafted to
address these concerns.
185. Id. at 434-35.
I86. H.R. REP. No. so8-144, at 6-7 (2003).
187. See Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 169, 206-08 (1990).
188. For this reason, the argument that the diversity jurisdiction was intended to prevent "class
bias" by providing protection against state legislatures "making decisions that were hostile to commer-
cial interests," sweeps too broadly if divorced from the requirement that such protection is accorded
for the benefit of those forced to litigate away from the courts of their own state. Joan Steinman,
Postremoval Changes in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and Rule
19, 38 KAN. L. REV. 863, 879-80 (199o). For a general review of scholarship exploring the purposes of
the Diversity Clause, see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 116, § 36oi.
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Yet another rationale advanced to support the proposed legislation
has been that state courts supposedly have inappropriately applied their
own procedural and substantive law to cases involving litigants from
other states. Congress has found that "State courts are.., making judg-
ments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the
rights of the residents of those States."' This rationale is both tenuous
and unconnected to the purpose of the Diversity Clause. Of course,
states are constrained by due process limits that prevent them from ap-
plying their own law to transactions with which they have no significant
contact or relation.'" But where such a connection does exist, they are
free to apply their ordinary choice of law rules to transactions having in-
terstate ramifications without violating the Commerce Clause or any
other provision of the Constitution. Under the Erie doctrine, federal
courts would be required to make the same choice-however ill-advised
it may be.'9 ' This result might be different if Congress were to adopt a
federal choice of law rule to govern interstate mass torts cases, as the
ALI's 1994 Complex Litigation Report suggested,'92 but the proposed
class action legislation contains no such provision. The "problem"-if it
is one-exists in both class action and individual litigation, and in both
federal and state courts. Proponents of this argument for the proposed
class action jurisdiction act have not explained how it serves the purposes
of the Diversity Clause, which is to prevent local bias against out-of-state
litigants that could be expected to exist in state court but not in federal
court.
2. Unobjectionable Provisions
In examining the proposed class action legislation certain points
should be put to one side. For example, the proposed legislation alters a
number of long-standing principles, such as (a) the rule arising from Sny-
der v. Harris'9 and Zahn v. International Paper Co.' that the claims of
class members may not be aggregated in determining the jurisdictional
amount; (b) the rule of complete diversity; and (c) rules requiring all de-
fendants properly served to join in a notice of removal and that none of
them be citizens of the state from which removal is sought.'95 Divorced
189. Class Action Fairness Act of 2oo3, H.R. 11I5, io8th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(C) (2003).
i9o. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 313 (1981).
191. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (I941).
192. ALl REPORT, supra note I, § 6.oi.
193. 394 U.S. 332, 339-42 (I969).
194. 414 U.S. 291 , 301-O2 (1973).
195. See 28 U.S.C. § I44I(b) (2000) (any action that does not arise "under the Constitution, trea-
ties or laws of the united States ... shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought"); id. § i446(a)
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from the overly broad way in which they are applied in the proposed leg-
islation, none of these alterations raises significant constitutional con-
cerns, even applying a rigorous standard of necessary and proper review.
For example, the Constitution prescribes no jurisdictional amount
for diversity cases, and whether it should exist, and in what amount,
clearly remains entirely within Congress's control. The results in Snyder
and Zahn rested on the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that Rule 23
was not intended to alter the long-standing rule of statutory construction
precluding aggregation of claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases unless
they asserted a "common and undivided interest" in a "single title or
right."' But nothing in the Constitution speaks to this issue or precludes
Congress from altering this long-standing rule. Congress properly could
conclude that class actions in which the claims of the class, in aggregate,
exceed the sum or value of five million dollars exclusive of interest and
costs are sufficiently important to invoke the federal judicial power, as-
suming that the purposes of the Diversity Clause otherwise are served.
Similarly, again assuming that the purposes of the diversity jurisdic-
tion would be served, there is no magic in the long-standing "complete
diversity" requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss.'" That decision involved
plaintiffs asserting a joint interest, and the decision expressly left open
the possibility--not subsequently taken up--that the result might be dif-
ferent where the plaintiffs asserted separate and distinct claims.' 9 Al-
("A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State
court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such
action is pending a notice of removal ... "). See also 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 116, § 1756 (aggre-
gation of claims), § 1759 (describing rules governing removal in diversity cases); 13B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 116, § 3606 (diversity rule); 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note i16, § 3704 (aggregation of
claims).
196. In Snyder, the Court noted that "[tihe traditional judicial interpretation" of the diversity stat-
utes
has been from the beginning that the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs
cannot be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Aggregation
has been permitted only (I) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or
more of his own claims against a single defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more
plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided
interest.
394 U.S. at 335. The Court explained that Rule 23 did not bring about a change in the "doctrine that
separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated" and that the doctrine "was never, and is not
now, based upon the categories of old Rule 23." Id. at 336. The Court upheld this ruling in Zahn, con-
cluding that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and
any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case." 414 U.S. at 301. See also 7A WRGTrr ET
AL., supra note t16, § 1756; 14 B WIGHT ET AL., supra note s I6, § 3705.
197. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267-68 (18o6).
198. The Court explained in Strawbridge
that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue,
or may be sued, in the federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of the
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though Chief Justice Marshall did not elaborate, the common explana-
tion for this reservation has been that where local bias against an out-of-
state claimant necessarily would prejudice a local citizen as well-as it
would in the case of joint interests but not necessarily where the plaintiffs
asserted separate and independent claims-a jury would be unlikely to
find against an out-of-state citizen at the expense of one of their own. '
Whatever the explanation, Congress reasonably could find other-
wise, whether joint or several claims are at issue." Thus, if one or more
plaintiffs who are of diverse citizenship from a defendant jointly assert
claims with co-citizens of that defendant, Congress might reasonably
conclude that the diverse plaintiff or plaintiffs might suffer local bias in
the courts of the defendant's state despite the presence of co-citizens on
the same side.2°' The same is true where a plaintiff joins claims against
multiple defendants, some of whom are of diverse citizenship from the
plaintiff and some of whom are not.
For the same reason, the restriction preventing removal unless all
defendants join in the notice of removal and none of the defendants are
citizens of the state from which removal is sought might be abrogated by
Congress to protect a non-citizen defendant from local bias, even where
persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those
courts.
But the court does not mean to give an opinion in the case where several parties represent
several distinct interests, and some of those parties are, and others are not, competent to
sue, or liable to be sued, in the courts of the United States.
Id. at 267-68.
i99. See ALl STruDY, supra note too, at 433.
[T]he Strawbridge holding can probably best be justified on the theory that the purpose of
diversity jurisdiction was to protect an out-of-state citizen from possible prejudice at the
hands of a local tribunal, and that where the diverse citizen has a "joint" interest with a non-
diverse party, his protection lies in the fact that he cannot be discriminated against without
also hurting the non-diverse party.
Id.
200. The ALl Study explained further that, although Strawbridge's rationale might be accepted
"[a]s a construction of the statutory grant in Strawbridge," as a
construction of the Constitution it cannot stand. Even on a view of diversity jurisdiction as
serving only to allow protection of the out-of-state citizen from a hostile local tribunal,
surely Congress might at some time reasonably conclude that local tribunals could be so
hostile as to discriminate against non-citizens even at the cost of hurting one of their own,
and must therefore be able to extend a federal forum even where the interests are "joint."
Moreover, even on that same view of the jurisdiction's purpose and even assuming the ef-
fectiveness of "jointness" with co-citizens as protection, the concepts underlying ancillary
jurisdiction would authorize Congress to confer jurisdiction with less than total diversity.
Congress must be able to act to assure that resort to an authorized federal forum not be im-
peded by the imposition of extra burdens, such as the necessity of double litigation with its
inefficiency and expense. Certainly that would imply power to permit joinder of parties and
claims at least to the degree required to achieve that objective-a degree that would neces-





it is joined in the same action with local defendants who are not subject
to the same bias. The difficulty is not with the alteration of these princi-
ples in the abstract, but rather with the particular way in which the pend-
ing jurisdictional expansion legislation proposes that it be done.
Another pivotal aspect of the proposed class action reform legisla-
tion is the decision to consider the citizenship of all class members as well
as those of the named class representatives in determining whether
minimal diversity of citizenship exists.0 2 Of course, this departs from
long-standing practice in the federal courts, in which the citizenship only
of the named parties was considered." This practice did not result from
legislative direction, but from the common law, which regarded the class
representatives as the true parties to the action.2" Indeed, historically the
class action was a device permitting litigation to proceed without the
presence of otherwise necessary parties who could not, as a practical
matter, be joined."' In recent years, courts have held that unnamed class
members are not true "parties" in a variety of contexts, including such
matters as the ability to make strategic decisions, to conduct and be sub-
jected to discovery, and to appeal the results of the litigation? 6 On the
other hand, class members under Rule 23 and state class action rules are
true "parties" in a most significant sense because, provided the require-
ments of due process are satisfied, they may be legally bound by the
judgment in the action.2
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed these conflicting cur-
rents in Devlin v. Scardeletti. Departing from the prevailing view devel-
oped in the courts of appeals, the Court held that objecting class
members may appeal the adequacy of a class action settlement regardless
of whether they have intervened as parties in the trial court proceed-
202. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
203. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 1O (2oo2),
"[n]onnamed class members are.., not parties" for the purpose of determining diversity of citizen-
ship.
204. See supra note 203.
205. See supra note 123.
206. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-o9 (1985) (distinguishing between
the burdens imposed on absent members of a plaintiff's class and burdens imposed on parties before
the court); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628-29 (i ith Cir. 1987) (holding that a nonnamed class
member may not appeal a final litigated judgment entered against the class); Dellums v. Powell, 566
F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that discovery against absentee class members may be had un-
der certain circumstances only and not "as a matter of course"); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note I t6,
§ 1755.
207. See Hansberry v. Lee, 351 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Ep-
stein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 (1996) (stating that all members of a class in a class action suit are bound by
any judgment entered in the action unless they opt out). The Court in Matsushita held that class plain-
tiffs wishing to preserve their right to litigate their claims must "opt out of the settlement class" or risk
being bound by the result of the litigation. Id. at 379, 385.
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ings.'The Court emphasized that in determining whether class members
should be treated as parties to the litigation, the focus must be on the
purpose for which the question is asked.2"
With respect to the pending class action jurisdiction proposals, the
issue is whether diverse class members may be subjected to local preju-
dice despite the fact that all of the named class representatives are of the
same citizenship as all of the defendants. Conceivably this could be true,
particularly given the limitation in the most recent proposed legislation
carving out litigation in which most class members are citizens of the
same state as the "primary defendants" and the claims will be governed
by the laws of that state.2 I
3. Removal by In-state Citizen Defendants
One of the ironies of the movement for interstate class action reform
is that it is focused on protecting large corporate and other business de-
fendants from supposedly unjustified settlement pressure generated by
the threat of large damages awards in state courts regardless of their citi-
zenship or local presence. "' This concern is not related to the underlying
rationale of the diversity jurisdiction. Notably, the proposed legislation
continues to treat corporate defendants as citizens of both the states of
their incorporation and their principal place of business."I Because the
class action proposal permits removal of state litigation by any defendant
who is of diverse citizenship from any member of the plaintiff class, with-
out regard to the fact that the removing defendant may be a citizen of the
state in which the action was brought, 13 it is difficult to see how the legis-
lation is addressed to the problem of discrimination against non-citizens
208. Devlin v. Scardeletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002).
209. "Nonnamed class members, however, may be parties for some purposes and not for others.
The label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the appli-
cability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context." Id. at 9-Io.
210. It is troubling, however, that the question of whether actual prejudice against out-of-state
class members could be expected where most or a significant number of class members were of diverse
citizenship from the a defendant even though none of the named class representatives were, received
no attention in the history of the proposed legislation. Undoubtedly, the reason for this omission is the
fact that the legislation is not aimed at preventing prejudice to out-of-state class members at all.
Rather, it is aimed at protecting large corporate and other business defendants from allegedly unjusti-
fied verdicts in state courts, regardless of their state citizenship.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
212. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, io8th Cong. § 4 (2003). Section 4 of the pro-
posed legislation amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the general diversity statute, but makes no changes to
§ 1332(C)(I) which defines corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id.
213. Id. § 5 (adding a new § 14 53(b) to 28 U.S.C., which states, "[a] class action may be removed to
a district court of the United States in accordance with this chapter, without regard to whether any
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought").
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or out-of-state business enterprises that was the core concern of the Di-
versity Clause.
One might nevertheless contend that, given the arguments just re-
viewed supporting original federal court jurisdiction over class actions
involving "minimal diversity" between some class members and one or
more defendants, the validity of removal jurisdiction over such actions
follows as a matter of course. This argument would rest on the close tie
between original and removal jurisdiction reflected in the general re-
moval provision of the Judicial Code.214 But the general coextensiveness
of original and removal jurisdiction is not and historically has not been
complete. 15 Supporters of the legislation have assumed that the prohibi-
tion against removal by an in-state defendant, extant-with only a brief
hiatus -since the enactment of the first Judiciary Act,"' may be removed
without debate or concern. But such a long-settled practice established at
the foundation of the Republic provides some guidance regarding the
meaning of the Constitution itself.217 From the adoption of the Constitu-
tion until now, the Diversity Clause has been thought to provide an op-
tion for non-citizen plaintiffs to litigate either in federal or state court
214. 28 U.S.C. § i44i(a)-(b) (2oo0).
215. See FALLON, supra note iiO, at 1536-37.
216. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80 (789). The 1875 amendment to the
diversity removal statute allowed for removal in any case "in which there shall be a controversy be-
tween citizens of different States," and further allowed that "either party may remove said suit into the
circuit court of the United States for the proper district." Judiciary Act of 1875 § 2, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
"And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between
citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or
more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into
the circuit court of the United States for the proper district." Judiciary Act of 1875 § 2. This expansive
language, however, was repealed in 1887 and removal again was restricted to non-resident defendants.
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, §§ 1-2 24 Stat. 552-53 (1887) (as corrected by Judiciary Act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25
Stat. 433, 434 (1888)). This restriction has remained in effect to the present day. See 28 U.S.C.
§ I44I(b) (2000). See generally LA MOORE supra note 1 i6, 0.1 156[1]-[2].
217. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm. of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence
and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice of according the exemption to churches,
openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to
be lightly cast aside. Nearly 50 years ago Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "If a thing has been
practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Four-
teenth Amendment to affect it ... "
Id. at 678 (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,31 (1922)).
The existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a practice, such as tax exemptions
for religious organizations, is not conclusive of its constitutionality. But such practice is a
fact of considerable import in the interpretation of abstract constitutional language.... As
Mr. Justice Holmes observed in an analogous context, in resolving such questions of inter-
pretation "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." ... The more longstanding and
widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact upon constitutional interpretation.
Id. at 681 (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 (1921)).
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according to their own appraisal of the comparative advantages of doing
so, not to restrict them to the single option of federal court process at the
election of their in-state adversaries. Of course, Congress might alter this
understanding if it served the purposes of the Diversity Clause, but no
discernable connection between those purposes and the proposed re-
moval provision appears.
On the other hand, one might argue that diversity actions com-
menced by in-state plaintiffs or class representatives routinely are enter-
tained by the federal courts.218 This argument overlooks significant
differences between original actions commenced by in-state citizens and
class actions in which one or more members of the class are of diverse
citizenship from one defendant (even though none of the named plain-
tiffs may be) commenced in state court and then removed by an in-state
defendant or defendants to federal court. Original actions in which the
plaintiff or, in the class setting, named plaintiffs, are of diverse citizenship
from one or more defendants fit rather easily within the literal terms of
the Diversity Clause, which contains no language limiting its application
to situations in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs are non-citizens of the
state in which the action is brought."9 Moreover, apart from the fact that
the language of the Constitution fails to exclude original actions com-
menced by in-state citizens against non-citizens, Congress could have
concluded that the purposes of the Diversity Clause generally would be
served by authorizing federal jurisdiction over such actions. In such cases
an out-of-state citizen is being haled against its will into the courts of an-
other state. Although not all such defendants would be unwilling, Con-
gress might reasonably have concluded that most would welcome the
protection of a neutral federal forum, and would not be harmed.
These arguments are not necessarily transferable to a context not so
obviously within the text of the Diversity Clause, nor so readily tied to its
purposes. Unlike original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship,
removal jurisdiction is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitu-
tion. It has been sustained as an exercise of congressional power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.22 By their nature, jurisdictional pro-
218. It was this aspect of diversity jurisdiction that the 1968 ALI Study proposed to alter. See supra
notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.");
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (t Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (The "power of removal is not to be
found in express terms in any part of the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a




posals resting on necessary and proper implementation of the Diversity
Clause rather than its literal text, demand some connection between
congressional means and legitimate congressional ends. It is bootstrap-
ping to argue that it is necessary and proper to treat absent class
members as "parties" to achieve the purposes of the Diversity Clause,
and then to contend that their classification as parties justifies removal
by an in-state citizen without regard to those purposes.
Viewed in terms of the purposes of the Diversity Clause, removal by
defendants of class actions commenced in state court in which one or
more class members are diverse from defendants, all of whom are citi-
zens of the state in which the action is brought, implicates those purposes
remotely, if at all. Class actions commenced in state court by a named
representative on behalf of absent class members presumptively indicate
that the forum of choice for the class is that of the state, even though
some class members may be citizens of other states. This presumption
might be undercut if the named class representatives were shown to be
By the last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, Congress is in-
vested with power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution not
only all the powers previously specified, but also all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Among
these is the judicial power of the government.
Id.
Powers expressly enumerated are granted to Congress, and such as shall be necessary and
proper for carrying the enumerated powers into execution, or, in other words, the powers of
Congress are made up of concessions from the people of the several States, with such im-
plied powers as are necessary and proper to carry the express concessions into effect, sub-
ject to the limitation that whatever is not expressly granted or necessarily or properly
implied to carry the granted powers into effect is reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. Like the other powers specified, the judicial power of the United States is a con-
stituent part of those concessions from the several States, and as was held by this court at a
very early period, it is to be exercised by the Supreme Court or such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
Id. at 274-75 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Section i44I(c) finds support in Congressional power under the "necessary and proper"
clause of Article I, Section 8....
While the "necessary and proper" clause is not without limitation, it has been applied
to supply constitutional authority to support legislative policy where otherwise such author-
ity might be doubtful, Where considerations of convenience and economy of litigation dic-
tated, the expansive "necessary and proper" clause frequently has been relied upon to
sustain judicial power beyond the strict limits of Article III .... [T]he whole notion of re-
moval [for example], nowhere provided for in the Constitution, is itself a creature of Con-
gressional power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution... all Powers vested by this Constitution." Analogous extensions may be found
in the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction under which Federal courts adjudicate
many kinds of claims for which there is no independent jurisdictional basis rooted in Article
III.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 920-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (alteration in




inadequate, or if the class members had no right to opt out, but the de-
fendant removal provision of the proposed class action legislation con-
tains no such limitations."'
At the very least, a moderately demanding necessary and proper re-
view would require evidence that Congress had addressed this problem,
had a reasonable basis for finding that removal by in state defendants
would serve the purposes of the Diversity Clause in such a setting, and
that the remedy provided was significantly related to the purpose of pro-
tecting out-of-state citizens from prejudice in local courts."' No such con-
sideration or findings accompany the current class action proposals-
again probably for the reason that the provision for removal by in state
defendants was not included for the purpose of protecting class mem-
bers, but rather for the purpose of protecting the defendants them-
selves.223
One argument in support of the class action act's defendant removal
provision might invoke Congress's broad power to define, for diversity
purposes, the citizenship of corporate enterprises and other artificial en-
tities. 4 Congress left the definition of corporate citizenship for diversity
purposes for the U.S. Supreme Court to develop as a matter of federal
common law for over 150 years, during which the Court's views on the
matter evolved from treating a corporation as a citizen of every state of
which its shareholders or members were citizens to the presumption that
a corporation was a citizen only of its state of incorporation, its share-
holders being only represented or nominal parties."' In 1958, however,
Congress amended the Judicial Code to provide that a corporation
should be deemed a citizen of each state in which it was incorporated and
of the state in which its principal place of business was located26 This
provision was intended both to reduce the workload of the federal courts
and to remedy the abuse of permitting a corporation to invoke the diver-
sity jurisdiction against the citizens of a state in which its principal place
221. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-14 (1985) (recognizing the due process
right of class members lacking minimum contacts with the forum state to opt out of a class action seek-
ing damages relief).
222. See supra notes I41-65 and accompanying text.
223. A related argument in support of the class action jurisdiction proposal would point to the fact
that the current statutory requirement prohibiting removal by an in-state citizen may be waived if it
not properly raised by a motion to remand. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note I I6, §372 I, at 370-75.
But in this context, a plaintiff who is the intended beneficiary of the Diversity Clause has chosen to
litigate in federal court by failing to request a remand. In such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to
assume that maintenance of the action in federal court does protect the intended beneficiaries of the
diversity jurisdiction.
224. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note i 16, §§ 3623-30.
225. See id. § 3623.
226. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(I) (2000).
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of business was located, even though it was unlikely to suffer local preju-
dice in that state. 27 As such, it is logically tied to the existence of possible
local prejudice against non-residents, and falls well within Congress's
power under Article III, as augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to define and limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts within
the outer boundaries of Article III.
Perhaps Congress might have redefined corporate citizenship for di-
versity purposes so that a large corporation conducting interstate busi-
ness would not be deemed a citizen of the state of its principal place of
business, on the theory that such an interstate corporate enterprise might
suffer local prejudice even there because of its size and interstate connec-
tions. 1 8 But the class action jurisdiction act does not do so, and rests on
no findings to that effect. It preserves the existing definition of corporate
citizenship, reflecting the conclusion, embodied in section 1332(c)(I) of
the Judicial Code, 29 that a corporation is not likely to suffer local preju-
dice in the state in which it maintains its principal place of business, and
should not be able to invoke the diversity jurisdiction in an action by or
against opposing parties from that state. Neither the act's provisions nor
its rationale support the conclusion that Congress has redefined the citi-
zenship of corporate enterprises to tie the act's provisions for removal by
in-state corporations to the purposes of the Diversity Clause.
From another perspective, the class action act's defendant removal
provision might be argued to represent an effort by Congress to allow lo-
cal defendants to protect the interests of absent class members who are
citizens of another state. In Shutts, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that class action defendants had standing to raise the due process
objections of absent class members based on their absence of minimum
contacts with the forum.3 ' But Shutts provides a poor analogy in the pre-
sent context. Most notably, Shutts rested on the interest of the defen-
dants in that case in assuring themselves that any final class action
judgment would be binding on the absent class members."' In the inter-
state class action jurisdiction context, by contrast, in-state corporate de-
fendants presumably would benefit from the existence of local prejudice
against absent class members from other states. Additionally, the context
in Shutts differs fundamentally from that here. There, the Court acted to
227. See 13 B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note I6, § 3624.
228. But see Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. I115, io8th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(d)(8) (2003)
("For purposes of this subsection and section 1453 of this title, an unincorporated association shall be
deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and the State under
whose laws it is organized.").
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(i).




ensure that state courts could render a binding class judgment. In the
present context, the issue is not whether a state court class action judg-
ment would be binding-as it would provided that the notice, opt out,
and adequate representation requirements of that decision were satis-
fied.3 ' Rather, it is whether Congress intended to permit local defendants
to remove because it had some basis for believing that the rights of ab-
sent non-citizen class members were at issue and those members would
be unable adequately to protect their own interests. Nothing in the legis-
lative history suggests that Congress permitted removal by local defen-
dants in interstate class actions to achieve this purpose, or that the absent
class members who hypothetically might suffer local prejudice could not
protect their own interests by opting out or by themselves removing the
action from state to federal court.
4. Plaintiff Removal
Viewed from a plaintiffs' perspective, stronger arguments connect
the act to the purposes of the Diversity Clause. The act's findings and
history do focus on allegedly inadequate class settlements benefiting
primarily lawyers rather than class members in "interstate" class actions
in which the citizenship of a substantial number of class members differs
from that of the primary defendant or defendants. These findings are not
tied to any unique disadvantage suffered by out-of-state class members
on account of local bias, as opposed to disadvantages allegedly suffered
by class members in general regardless of their citizenship on account of
the alleged deficiencies of state courts. They do reflect the conclusion,
however, that the alleged problem of inadequate class settlements disad-
vantaging class members has been prevalent in class actions involving in-
terstate aspects. 33 These findings arguably relate closely enough to the
purpose of the Diversity Clause to assure an impartial and adequate fo-
rum to litigants forced to litigate "away from home" to sustain the act in
at least some of its applications. However, the removal provisions of the
act seem unconnected and disproportionate to the perceived problem,
even assuming that was their motivation. For example, any unnamed
class member may remove the entire action, regardless of the state of
citizenship of either the removing class member or of the defendant.34
Thus, an in-state citizen class member may remove not only its own claim
but the entire action from state to federal court, even though there is no
basis for finding that that plaintiff would be subject to local prejudice
leading to an inadequate settlement.
232. Id. at811.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94.
234. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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Perhaps this provision might be rationalized on the ground that re-
moval by non-diverse class members serves to protect the interests of
other class members who might be subject to local bias. Although per-
haps plausible, the legislative history and findings contain no indication
that Congress ever considered this possibility, or that the act was in-
tended to address it. Nothing would prevent allegedly disadvantaged
class members from protecting themselves from possible local bias lead-
ing to an inadequate settlement by opting out of the action-a right
which they would possess in any class action seeking damages not only
under all state class action rules modeled after Rule 23, but also arguably
under the Due Process Clause itself.235 Additionally, the removing class
members are allowed not simply to remove their own claims, but also
those of all other class members, including those of class members who
are not of diverse citizenship from the defendants and who would prefer
the choice of the class representatives to litigate in state court.36
In this last respect, the act's plaintiff removal provisions represent a
very large intrusion on the ability and autonomy of named class repre-
sentatives-as well as of the class members themselves-to choose a
state forum which they believe may be more favorable to their interests
than a federal court. That intrusion is accompanied by a corresponding
interference with the sovereign interests of the states in affording a judi-
cial forum to their own citizens. Perhaps this impairment of state sover-
eignty could be justified by analogy to the now repealed separate and
independent claim provision of the Judicial Code which, as it formerly
applied to diversity cases, allowed any diversity defendant who was not a
citizen of the state in which an action was commenced to remove not
only the diverse claim against that defendant, but also the entire action
of which it was a part, provided the diversity claim was "separate and in-
dependent" from other claims asserted in the action.237 But putting aside
the fact that the constitutionality of the separate and independent claim
provision in diversity actions was never directly considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court,238 the analogy seems weak, as protection of the removing
non-citizen party in such actions fell within the core purpose of the Di-
versity Clause. In such circumstances, Congress may have concluded that
removal of the entire action, coupled with a provision allowing but not
requiring remand of the non-jurisdictional claims,239 represented the best
235. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 8I I.
236. See supra text accompanying note 77.
237. See 14 C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 116, § 3724.
238. Id. The Court appeared to assume the validity of the provision in Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S.
205 (188o). but did not directly consider the question.
239. § i44i(c) in its 1948 version provided:
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balance of the competing interests at stake.24 This approach continued to
respect the plaintiff's initial joinder decisions while protecting out-of-
state litigants from local bias."'
5. Removal Before Class Certification and in Non-class Actions
Other provisions of the act also raise concerns under a necessary and
proper analysis. For example, the act allows a defendant to remove a
class action meeting its requirements even before a class action has been
certified.242 To the extent that federal jurisdiction in such cases is based
on the diverse citizenship of class members, rather than that of the
named class representatives, it allows removal of an action even though
no plaintiff party is of diverse citizenship from any defendant at the time
of removal. 43 Even under the most liberal view, however, before the ac-
tion has been certified as a class action, the members of the purported
class are merely prospective, rather than actual "parties" to the action.'
From the time of the first Judiciary Act until now, removal in diversity
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable
if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of
action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original juris-
diction.
28 U.S.C. § I441(c) (948). The current version of § i44I(c) applies only to federal question cases. See
28 U.S.C. § 144I(C) (2000).
240. The class action act permits the actions covered by its provisions to be commenced originally
in federal court where one or more class representatives are citizens of the different states than one or
more defendants, even if some of the named plaintiffs are citizens of the same state as some defen-
dants. or, in cases where all of the named class representatives are citizens of the same state as the de-
fendants, if a substantial number of class members are citizens of a different state. Here, as in the case
of removal by out-of-state defendants, the act appears to be logically related to the purpose of the di-
versity clause. Even assuming the absence of complete diversity among the named parties, Congress
might reasonably conclude that the presence of one or more named representatives of diverse citizen-
ship, or of a substantial number of diverse class members, could lead to local prejudice against the
class as a whole. Although Congress did not specifically articulate this chain of reasoning in its findings
and conclusions, and the legislative hearing record does not focus on it, the act's overall conclusions
that "interstate" class actions involving a substantial number of class members of different state citi-
zenship than one or more defendants have presented a substantial risk of inadequate class settlements
might well be accepted as adequately tied to the core purposes of the Diversity Clause.
241. A plaintiff wishing to litigate in state court could voluntarily dismiss the diverse defendant
and seek a remand to state court, or could voluntarily dismiss the action and refile the action omitting
the diverse defendant in state court. Congress also could have viewed the provision for removal of the
entire action to be necessary to avoid deterring removal by the non-resident defendant because of the
prospect of duplicative litigation in both federal and state court. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913920-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 116, § 3724.
242. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 115, io8th Cong. §5 (2003) (adding § 1453(c) to the
Judicial Code).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, i6 n.i (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not even
petitioner.. . is willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous argument that a nonnamed class
member is a party to the class-action litigation before the class is certified.") (emphasis in original).
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cases has turned on the citizenship of those who are actually parties to an
action, not of those who might become parties through amendment or
otherwise. Similarly, the most recent version of the proposed legislation
treats as class actions not only non-class actions in which monetary claims
of one hundred or more claimants are joined in the same action (in which
case the arguments previously outlined based on possible inadequate
representation of the class in choosing a state forum are inapplicable),
but also any action in which the plaintiff "purports to act for the interests
of its members (who are not named parties to the action) or for the inter-
ests of the general public" in seeking damages, restitution, or other
monetary relief, other than a state attorney general.245 The import of this
language is hardly clear, but it apparently was intended to encompass ac-
tions similar to those authorized by the California unfair competition
law.246 Clearly however, it purports to authorize original or removal juris-
diction over actions in which none of the parties before the court is of di-
verse citizenship from any adverse party. This would be an
unprecedented extension of diversity jurisdiction.
6. Summary
In sum, the provisions of the class action jurisdiction act expanding
federal original and removal jurisdiction are in some respects arguably
tied to the purposes of the Diversity Clause, but in other, significant re-
spects, such as the broad rights of removal conferred on in-state defen-
dants and plaintiffs, sweep considerably beyond what those purposes
logically might require. Perhaps ultimately those provisions might pass
muster. Perhaps the alleged problem of inadequate class settlements in
actions in which some class members might be subject to out-of-state bias
is of sufficient magnitude that any class action presenting that danger
should be litigated in federal court. Perhaps that is true despite the
wishes of those allegedly subject to that discrimination to litigate in state
court where the prospects of a large jury verdict might, by the hypothesis
of those promoting this legislation, be greater than in federal court. But
Congress, in passing the proposed class action legislation, did not articu-
late the chain of reasoning that led it to conclude that the expansive pro-
visions of the proposed legislation were tailored to serve purposes
245. H.R. III5 § 4(a)(2) (adding new § I3 3 2(d)( 9)(A), (B) to the 28 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
This provision is deleted from S. 1751, a proposed substitute for S. 274. See supra note 70.
246. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2002). Section 17204 authorizes "any person
acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public" to sue. § 17204. It is settled, how-
ever, that only equitable remedies such as injunctions and restitution are authorized by that statute.
See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S.
1099 (2003), cert. dismissed, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); Kraus v. Trinity Management
Serv's, Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725 (Cal. 2000); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 789,
799 (Cal. App. 1989).
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underlying the Diversity Clause. A requirement that means be connected
to legitimate ends would focus congressional attention on the questions
previously raised, and might well result in revisions that would prevent
the proposed legislation from being used by in-state business interests
seeking protection from the courts of their own states. 47
B. THE MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF 2002
Like the proposed class action legislation, the Multiparty, Multifo-
rum Act bases federal jurisdiction on the existence of "minimal diver-
sity" between any two adverse parties, allows removal of an entire action
from state court by any defendant without the consent of that defen-
dant's co-parties, and allows removal even if one or more defendants-
including the defendant seeking removal-is a citizen of the state from
which removal is sought."' The Multiparty, Multiforum Act thus raises
many of the same issues already discussed in connection with the pro-
posed class action legislation. At the same time, the multiparty, multifo-
rum legislation, which has a much longer lineage than the class action
proposals, differs from them in several important respects, and in some
applications presents even more difficult problems of federal jurisdiction.
i. Impermissible Objectives
One obvious area of difference is the stated purpose of the acts. The
class action proposals at least make some effort to articulate purposes
that might align their provisions for expansion of federal jurisdiction with
those of the Diversity Clause. In basing the act on alleged class action
abuses in state court, the act at least opens the possibility that its provi-
sions are designed to protect out-of-state citizens from prejudice as a re-
sult of inadequate scrutiny of class actions and settlements in state
court. 9 By contrast, the underlying purpose of the multiparty, multifo-
rum legislation from its inception in the 1970S until the enactment of the
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 has been to
achieve judicial economy and consistent results by consolidating in fed-
eral court disparate litigation that no single state could entertain on its
own. 5' Proponents of the legislation have not argued that its sweeping
247. See Marshall v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (i6 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (noting that the di-
versity jurisdiction was intended to protect distant plaintiffs from the power and influence wielded by
corporations "in almost every state"). Even assuming that the legislation might pass constitutional
muster, the diversity jurisdiction should not, as a matter of policy, be expanded without regard for the
purposes that it serves. See Frankfurter, supra note 114, at 514 (noting that it would be improvident to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts "to every subject, in every form, which the constitution
might warrant") (quoting Turner v. Bank of Am., 1o U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799)).
248. See supra Part I.C.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 57-68.
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provisions, particularly those relating to removal and intervention, are
necessary to protect citizens forced to litigate away from home, promot-
ing fairness and interstate commercial intercourse in that way. The mul-
tiparty, multiforum legislation assumes that the unadorned existence of
"minimal diversity" found somewhere among a consolidated group of
transactionally related claims-even if they have been independently as-
serted in separate state court actions in which no diversity of citizenship
exists-provides a sufficient jurisdictional "hook" on which to hang legis-
lation directed to other ends."' For the reasons previously discussed,252
this lack of focus on the purposes of the very clause of the Constitution
on which jurisdiction under the multiparty, multiforum legislation is
grounded should raise serious concern. Even under the traditional, re-
laxed version of the necessary and proper analysis articulated in
McCulloch v. Maryland,53 that question turns on whether the purposes
sought to be achieved are a "legitimate" object of the national govern-
ment, and whether the means chosen are "plainly adapted to that end." '254
The legislative history of the Multiparty, Multiforum Act contents it-
self with the pro forma citation of the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in
the Tashire case for the proposition that jurisdiction based on minimal
diversity is constitutional.55 But as previously explained, Tashire involved
251. See supra text accompanying notes 12-26 and notes 57-68.
252. See supra Part IV.A.
253. 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
254. Id.
255. There is little mention of the jurisdictional basis for the multiparty, multiforum acts in their
respective legislative histories, but early proponents of the legislation mention Tashire as support for
the proposition that minimal diversity is a constitutionally sufficient. Alan B. Morrison, an early pro-
ponent of Federal court mass tort jurisdiction based on minimal diversity, stated, "there is no question
that the minimal diversity provided here, as in the interpleader, is constitutional, and any greater de-
gree of diversity would prevent the consolidation of these cases which it is the aim of this amendment
to provide." 1978 Hearings, supra note 57, at 182 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public
Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.). Later Morrison explained that, under Tashire,
a case can enter the Federal courts with one diverse plaintiff and one diverse defendant and
that that is what has been upheld in the interpleader action. Here, where the purpose is to
try to encourage these kinds of cases to come into the Federal courts, there is no reason to
burden them with excessive diversity requirements.
Id. at 186.
During the next Congress and as part of the Department of Justice's proposal, Daniel J. Meador
also noted that the jurisdictional basis for the acts is minimal diversity, based on the Tashire ruling.
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform -1979: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 96th Cong. i6o (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Hearings] (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office for Im-
provements in the Administration of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice). Mr. Meador noted,
[iut is intended that the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (8o6)-which
requires complete diversity as the basis for federal jurisdiction-shall not apply to actions
brought pursuant to this section. The touchstone of the jurisdictional requirement provided
by this section is minimal diversity which the Supreme Court has held is enough to meet the
requirements of the Constitution.
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an interpleader setting in which jurisdiction over all claims to the same
property was essential if the federal court was to resolve the diversity
claim properly before it.2"6 The conclusion that this limited holding based
on clear necessity stands for the proposition that jurisdiction based on
"minimal diversity" may be extended to other, entirely different contexts
is unwarranted. No such necessity exists in the case of duplicative fed-
eral/state litigation arising from the same transaction. Diversity claims
arising from one accident or transaction may be entirely and successfully
litigated in federal court without the joinder of non-diverse claims that
may arise from the same events-as they have been since the founding of
the Republic.57 The contention that it would be more rational and effi-
cient if they all were resolved in one forum has no apparent connection
to the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction.
2. Party Joinder
A central feature of the multiparty, multiforum legislation has been
the authorization for multiple plaintiffs to join their claims arising out of
a single transaction-or, in the most recent versions of the act, accident-
in a single original federal court action against one or more defendants
even though not all plaintiffs are of diverse citizenship from all defen-
dants as Strawbridge v. Curtiss presently requires."' That provision might
be thought to promote the purposes of the diversity clause by avoiding
deterrence of the use of the federal forum by its intended beneficiaries.
As the ALI's 1968 Study points out, joinder of transactionally related
claims against multiple defendants in a single action may be necessary to
permit the plaintiff to join all potentially liable defendants in a single
case, minimizing litigation costs and avoiding the possibility of inconsis-
tent judgments in separate actions. 59 Absent such a provision, a federal
plaintiff possessing transactionally related claims against both diverse
and non-diverse defendants might be deterred from invoking federal ju-
risdiction to resolve its claim against defendants of diverse citizenship,
Id. at i6o (citing State Farm Fire & Ins. Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (967)).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 95-too.
257. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (i97o); Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 26o U.S. 226 (1922).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 57-68.
259. In particular, that Study argued that the voluntary joinder of multiple plaintiffs or defendants,
some diverse and some not diverse from each other, might be supported on the ground that
inefficiency and added costs might be sufficient to discourage use of the federal courts by
those specifically intended to be protected by a federal forum. Congress must be able to
remove impediments of this kind that might make the federal forum less attractive than the
state courts and thus impose a burden on invoking federal jurisdiction.
ALI STuDY, supra note too, at 43o n.13 (supporting Memorandum A). Again, "Congress must be able
to act to assure that resort to an authorized federal forum not be impeded by the imposition of extra
burdens, such as the necessity of double litigation with its inefficiency and expense." Id. at 434.
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choosing instead to litigate in a state court where all of its claims could be
economically and consistently resolved in the same action. Similarly, a
group of plaintiffs injured by a single defendant as a result of a single
transaction or series of transactions may well conclude that the strength
and economic viability of their case will be enhanced if they join their
claims together in a single action. Absent the ability to join both diverse
and non-diverse claims in a single federal action, these considerations
might deter plaintiffs having proper diversity claims from asserting them
in federal court, driving them to a state forum where their prospects
would be higher. Under a necessary and proper analysis, Congress or the
rules drafters rationally could choose to remove these impediments to
the invocation of federal diversity jurisdiction to assure that the purposes
of the Diversity Clause are achieved. But greater difficulties are encoun-
tered as the full range of application of the legislation is examined.
3. Removal
This is particularly true of the expanded removal provisions of the
Multiparty, Multiforum Act. In their narrowest application, these provi-
sions are defensible implementations of the Diversity Clause. If an out-
of-state citizen defendant is joined in state court with other plaintiffs or
defendants who may not be completely diverse from their adversaries,
that non-citizen defendant might nonetheless be subject to local preju-
dice, and thus is a legitimate object of the protection that the Diversity
Clause was intended to provide. Perhaps that protection might be af-
forded by allowing that defendant to remove only the claims against it,
leaving the balance of the litigation in state court. Just as in the case of
the long-standing but now-repealed "separate and independent claim"
provision of the removal statute applied in diversity cases, however,
Congress might reasonably conclude that plaintiff's joinder decisions re-
flect strategic and efficiency considerations that should be respected, and
choose instead to retain the shape of the litigation as originally framed,
while affording the protection of a federal forum to a removing non-
citizen.2'6 That decision would not simply achieve judicial economy, but
avoid a deterrent to removal by the out-of-state defendant raised by the
prospect of repetitive litigation in federal and state court.
This rationale is not applicable to more expansive applications of the
Act's removal provision. Like the proposed class action legislation, the
Act authorizes removal of an action that could originally have been
brought by the plaintiffs in federal court under its provisions by any de-
fendant even though all defendants are citizens of the state from which
260. See supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
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removal is sought.,6' The difficulty in reconciling this provision with the
purposes of the diversity jurisdiction already has been discussed in con-
nection with the similar provision of the proposed class action legisla-
tion.6' How is the protection of out-of-state citizens from local prejudice,
or the promotion of interstate commerce by affording the guarantee of a
neutral forum to interstate business enterprises forced to litigate "away
from home," promoted by permitting in state citizens to remove actions
filed in the courts of their own state by out-of-state plaintiffs? The con-
nection under the Multiparty, Multiforum Act is even more tenuous than
that under the class action jurisdiction proposal, however. In the former
context no argument can be constructed that removal by in-state citizen
defendants may be necessary to protect the interests of perhaps inade-
quately represented class members.
Even greater difficulty is presented by another aspect of the Multi-
party, Multiforum Act's removal provisions. Through successive drafts,
the Act has authorized the removal from state court of a free-standing
action in which there is no diversity of citizenship at all, provided that one
defendant to the action is a party to another action satisfying the Act's
minimal diversity and single accident requirements "which is or could
have been brought, in whole or in part.., in a United States district
court" under the Act's provisions, and which "arises from the same acci-
dent as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could
not have been brought in a district court as an original matter.' '263 This
provision achieves the efficiency goal of the legislation, but neither the
proponents of the legislation nor its legislative history have offered any
justification for it in terms of the purposes of the Diversity Clause.
Such a rule of mandatory joinder of an action comprising only non-
diverse state law claims with a federal diversity action arising out of the
same facts is not justified by the necessity to facilitate access to federal
court by plaintiffs who possesses diversity claims that are closely related
to non-diverse claims by other plaintiffs or against other defendants. By
definition, the plaintiffs covered by the removal provisions have no such
diverse claims. Nor is removal in this context justified by the need to pro-
tect the in-state citizen defendant from prejudice in the courts of its own
state. The fact that such a defendant might be subject to such prejudice in
other litigation filed by other plaintiffs is beside the point. To justify such
an unprecedented intrusion on the retained powers of the states, more
261. See supra text accompanying note 64.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 211-32.
263. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § I o2o(b)(3)(B),
116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (2002) (adding new section (e)(t) to 28 U.S.C. § I44I) (emphasis added).
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should be required than the bare citation of the U.S. Supreme Court's
unelaborated decision in Tashire.
4. Intervention
The Multiparty, Multiforum Act's intervention provision also war-
rants closer scrutiny. Under the Act, long-standing rules governing inter-
vention and supplemental jurisdiction would be disregarded. Those rules,
which, have clear antecedents in historic joinder practice,64 require a
proposed intervenor of right to possess an interest in the subject matter
of the action in which intervention is sought that is not adequately repre-
sented by existing parties and that will, as a practical matter, be preju-
diced if intervention is not allowed.265 The current supplemental
jurisdiction statute controversially has excluded claims by and against
non-diverse intervenors of right in diversity actions, regardless of
whether they would be regarded as necessary or indispensable parties
under Rule 19.266 However, preexisting law and respected analysis leave
little doubt that recognition of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims
of intervenors meeting the requirements of current Rule 24(a) would be
consistent with Article 111.267 That result follows from the recognition that
Congress must have the power to prevent the judgments of federal courts
in cases properly pending before them from prejudicing, legally or prac-
tically, the rights of those not before the court.68
The Multiparty, Multiforum Act alters these long-standing principles
by permitting intervention of right in a pending federal action meeting its
minimal diversity requirements by any person asserting a claim arising
out of the accident giving rise to the pending action, without regard to
264. See supra text accompanying notes 113-30.
265. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
266. 28 US.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
[T]he district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction... over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising sup-
plemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional re-
quirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). See also Arthur & Freer, supra note 54, at 966; Fairman, supra note 54; Freer, su-
pra note 54 at 474-79.
267. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note I16, §1917; Freer, supra note 54, at 474-79; McLaughlin,
supra note 54, at 958-70; Wendy Collins Perdue, The New Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-Flawed
but Fixable, 41 EMORY L.J. 69, 77-81 (i9i); Joan Steinman, Section I367-Another Party Heard From,
41 EMORY L.J. 85, 105-07 (1992).
268. By contrast, under existing law, Rule 24(b)'s authorization for permissive intervention where
the proposed intervenor's claim has a "question of law or fact in common" with those asserted in the
main action will not support the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction, but requires that the proposed




the requirements of Rule 24(a), "even if [the proposed intervenor] could
not have brought an action in a district court as an original matter.
'269
Thus, a plaintiff who is not of diverse citizenship from any defendant in
the pending federal action, who asserts no claim arising under federal
law, and who possesses no interest in the subject matter of the action,
may join the federal action over the objections of some of all of the exist-
ing parties, and contrary to long-standing federal practice and the his-
toric antecedents of the present intervention rule.270 Under only a
modestly demanding necessary and proper screen, this proposed expan-
sion of the diversity jurisdiction at the expense of state courts raises con-
cern. The expansion of federal jurisdiction over actions originally filed in
federal court in which only minimal diversity between adverse parties is
present might be justified on the ground that such a provision is neces-
sary to facilitate access to federal court by those who possess diverse
claims that they wish to join with non-diverse claims for strategic and
economic reasons. No similar justification can be advanced for the Mul-
tiparty, Multiforum Act's authorization for litigants asserting no diversity
claims at all to intervene in a pending federal action. That joinder is not
necessary to facilitate the assertion of the claims of the parties before the
court, because they already have invoked the federal forum. Nor is join-
der of a non-diverse claim necessary to facilitate access to the federal
court by the proposed intervenor because, by definition, the intervenor is
not an intended beneficiary of the Diversity Clause. In short, no "neces-
sary and proper" basis for the inclusion of such claims in the pending
federal action readily appears.'
C. THE RELEVANCE OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
As previously discussed, the proposals of the ALI's 1994 Complex
Litigation Project were in some respects broader than those of the Mul-
tidistrict, Multiparty Act. In its enacted version, that Act applies only to
civil actions that arise from a "single accident" in which more than sev-
enty-five persons have died "at a discrete location," and certain other
269. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § I IO2O(b)(i)(A),
116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (2002) (adding a new §i 3 69 (d) to 28 U.S.C.).
270. See supra note 117 (for historic antecedents).
271. Because allowing such intervention would simply add another non-diverse claimant who
could have been included voluntarily in the original action under the suggested rationale, one might
argue that permitting such a party to join the action later by intervening entails no significant expan-
sion of federal court domain under the diversity clause. What this line of argument leaves out, how-
ever, is that the diversity justification for permitting the voluntary joinder of non-diverse parties in an
original action does not extend to those not voluntarily joined. The intended beneficiaries of the Di-
versity Clause have already asserted their claims in federal court without conceiving any necessity for
the joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs.
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qualifications are met.2 By contrast, the ALI's 1994 proposal broadly
would have authorized removal, transfer, and consolidation of any state
court action that involved a "common question of fact" with a pending
federal action, regardless of whether the parties to the state court action
were of diverse citizenship, provided that the state court action arose
from the "same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or oc-
currences" as a pending federal action. 3
Despite their differing scopes, the Multiparty, Multiforum Act and
the ALI's complex litigation proposal share common ground. They both
authorize removal of state court actions involving minimal, or even no,
diversity of citizenship between the parties, and they abolish the long-
standing rules requiring that (a) only defendants may remove; (b) all de-
fendants must join in the notice of removal; and (c) removal be denied
where any defendant to the removed action is a citizen of the state from
which removal is sought. 4 To this extent, they present many of the same
issues, despite the potentially much broader scope of the ALI's proposal.
Moreover, they rest on the common premise that because "complete di-
versity" is only a statutory rather than a constitutional requirement, any
consolidated federal action in which a "minimal diversity hook" is found
properly may be litigated in federal court. They assume that to be true
even where some of the claims in that action originally were filed in state
court, involved no diversity of citizenship at the time they were filed in
and removed from state court, and acquired the status of "minimal" di-
versity only by virtue of their consolidation with a pending federal action
between diverse parties.
Although the ALI Report referred briefly to Tashire and the con-
cept of minimal diversity, it instead grounded its recommendations for
expansion of federal jurisdiction primarily on the concept of "supple-
mental" jurisdiction. 5 According to the ALI, provided that the claims in
the consolidated federal action were "transactionally related" to those in
the removed and transferred state proceedings, the federal court might
exercise jurisdiction over all of them under the concept of pendent juris-
diction as developed in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs16 and subsequent
decisions. In Gibbs, the U.S. Supreme Court had sustained the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over a non-diverse state law claim that arose out of
a "common nucleus of operative fact" with a federal question claim.2"
272. See supra text accompanying notes 57-68.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 32-56.
274. 28 U.S.C. §I44i(b) (2000).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 32-56.




The Court stated that where such a transactional relationship existed, the
claims before the federal court constituted "one constitutional case" fal-
ling within the scope of Article 111. 8
In its focus on the relationship of the jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional claims, the ALI properly recognized that the formal pres-
ence of minimal diversity between any two claims in an action without
regard to the relationship of those claims or the posture in which they
arose, does not, in an of itself, provide a sufficient basis for upholding the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over the entire action.79 The doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction, like the antecedent doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction from which it descends, asks whether the relation-
ship between the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims in the action
is such that all of the claims may appropriately be said to be part of one
"arising under" or diversity case.8' This is consistent with recent scholar-
ship concluding that federal court jurisdiction is "claim specific" and that
federal jurisdiction over an entire civil action properly is found to exist
only if all of the claims asserted in the action fall within the original juris-
diction of the federal courts or are supplemental to those that do. 8' The
"minimal diversity" thesis underlying the Multiparty, Multiforum Act
and the proposed class action jurisdiction legislation, by contrast, does
not inquire whether each claim in the action properly falls within the
original or supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rather, it as-
278. Id.
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim "arising
under [federal law]," and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits
the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
case. ... The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear
the whole.
Id. (emphasis in original).
279. Other recognitions of this point include C. Douglas Floyd, The ALl, Supplemental Jurisdic-
tion, and the Federal Constitutional Case, 1995 BYU L. REV. 819, 856 (1995); Steinman, supra note to7,
at 745-46, 758-59; McLaughlin, supra note 54, at 903, 910.
280. See supra note 278.
281. See, e.g., John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Progress Report on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 26, 40, 46 (1998) (conclud-
ing that the "fundamental unit of litigation" for the purpose of federal court jurisdiction is the claim
rather than the "civil action" and describing the rule of "complete diversity" as a common law limita-
tion on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse claims). Professor Oakley was the
reporter for the ALI's recent Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, and his ideas find expression in
its proposed revisions to the supplemental jurisdiction statute. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Federal
Judicial Code Revision Project, Tent. Draft No. 2 (t998) (proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367). Pro-
fessor Oakley assumes that a transactional relationship among claims asserted in the same action is
sufficient to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity as well as federal question
cases. Oakley, supra, at 46-47. The validity of that common assumption is addressed in depth below.
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serts that so long as any one claim in an action including multiple claims
properly joined under extant rules of party and claim joinder is between
diverse citizens, the entire action may be maintained in federal court.
This theory disregards the critical point that, just as where non-diverse
state law claims are joined to federal question claims, actions involving
the joinder of diverse and non-diverse state-law claims should be held to
fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts only if the relationship
between the diversity claims and the non-diverse state law claims justifies
bringing the latter before the court as an exercise of supplemental juris-
diCtlOn. 282
i. Necessary and Proper Limits on the Exercise of Supplemental
Jurisdiction over Non-diverse State Law Claims
To this the supporters of the federal jurisdiction expansion proposals
might demur, on the ground that they assume the very kind of transac-
tional relationship among the joined claims that the U.S. Supreme Court
found to be sufficient to support the exercise of pendent claim jurisdic-
tion in Gibbs.3 In its 1994 Complex Litigation Report, the ALI con-
cluded that the Gibbs transactional relationship test for pendent claim
jurisdiction's4 "has provided the starting point for analyzing ancillary ju-
risdiction" involving the joinder of third parties to an action as well. 
5
The Re ort pointed out that in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, T the Court had stated that the problem of pendent claim juris-
diction in Gibbs and that of ancillary jurisdiction over the third party
claims before the Court in Owen Equipment were "two species of the
same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court
hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same
State?"'2"7 But just as the proponents of the minimal diversity thesis have
relied too much on the formal presence of diverse citizenship between
any two adverse parties in an action containing multiple claims, so the
proponents of the supplemental jurisdiction thesis have erred in their as-
sumption that the presence of some sort of transactional relationship
among non-diverse state law claims removed and consolidated with a
282. See supra notes 279-81 and authorities cited therein.
283. See supra note 277.
284. Gibbs more precisely required that the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims arise out of
a "common nucleus of operative fact" for the assertion of pendent claim jurisdiction, a test that the
courts have since tended to equate with the "same transaction or occurrence" language of Rule 20 and
other joinder provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me.,
112 F.3d 538, 563-64 (Ist Cir. 1997); Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1997);
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972,989-90 (3d Cir. 1984).
285. ALl REPORT, supra note I, §5.03, at 258.
286. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
287. Id. at 370.
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pending federal action automatically should be held to satisfy the re-
quirements of supplemental jurisdiction.
This difficulty is more fundamental than the fact that, at the time of
removal and before consolidation, state law actions or claims between
non-diverse citizens lie outside the scope of Article III, even assuming
that they might fall within federal supplemental jurisdiction after they
have been consolidated with actions or claims that do fall within Article
III1 . Beyond this, the ALI proposal may have stretched the Gibbs's
"common nucleus of operative fact" standard to or beyond the breaking
point by requiring only that a non-diverse state law action arise-not
from a "common nucleus of operative fact" such that a plaintiff would be
expected to try all of her claims in one action, as specified by Gibbs-but
merely from the same "series of transactions or occurrences" as a pend-
ing federal action.28 Even more fundamentally, however, the proposal
erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions to have endorsed
a "transactional" approach to supplemental jurisdiction not only in the
pendent claim context at issue in Gibbs, but also as to exercises of pen-
dent party and ancillary jurisdiction.?" In fact, the Court's post-Gibbs de-
cisions went out of their way to reserve that question, and to emphasize
that it raised important questions regarding the limits of Article Ill.29
In Owen Equipment, the Court declined to determine whether the
issues of federal jurisdiction in the two contexts should be treated in the
same way. Instead, the Court rested its holding solely on statutory
grounds, concluding that Congress had not authorized the federal courts
to entertain direct claims by the original plaintiff against a non-diverse
third party defendant because that would threaten the complete diversity
requirement of the diversity statute as interpreted in Strawbridge v. Cur-
tiss.292 In reaching that conclusion, the Court simply assumed that there
was constitutional power to entertain all of the claims, and expressly de-
clined to decide "whether there are any principled differences between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had
on such differences." '93 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the resolu-
tion of a third party complaint has a far closer relationship to the original
action than do independent claims voluntarily joined by the plaintiff
based on a transactional relationship among them: "A third-party com-
plaint depends at least in part upon the resolution of the primary lawsuit.
288. See Steinman, supra note io7, at 756-59 (discussing this difficulty).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 32-56.
290. See supra note 285.
291. See infra text accompanying notes 292-302.
292. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 38o-8i (978).
293. Id. at 370 n.8.
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Its relation to the original complaint is thus not mere factual similarity
but logical dependence."294
The Court's treatment of what, before the enactment of the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute,29 was termed "pendent party" jurisdiction
over claims by or against additional plaintiffs or defendants joined in the
original complaint, was similarly circumspect. In Moore v. County of
Alameda96 the Court held that the district court's refusal to entertain a
pendent party claim against a county defendant in an action against local
law enforcement officials under 41 U.S.C. § 1983 was not an abuse of dis-
cretion in light of the likelihood of jury confusion. Accordingly, the
Court found it unnecessary to resolve the scope of constitutional power
of the federal courts over such claims, noting that "there is a significant
difference" between the pendent claim jurisdiction at issue in Gibbs and
pendent party jurisdiction which "would require us to bring an entirely
new party" into the litigation." Even though most circuits had endorsed
such pendent party jurisdiction, the Court cautioned that "[w]hether
there exists judicial power to hear the state law claims against the County
is, in short, a subtle and complex question with far-reaching implica-
tions."9
The Court followed the same cautionary approach in Aldinger v.
Howard," which rejected the assertion of pendent party jurisdiction in a
section 1983 action on statutory grounds. The Court again found it un-
necessary to decide whether there was any "principled distinction" be-
tween pendent claim and pendent party jurisdiction, and declined to
reach the constitutional issue. However, it pointedly observed that de-
spite the gains in judicial economy that might be achieved by the asser-
tion of pendent party jurisdiction in such cases, the addition of a
completely new party to the federal action without any independent basis
of federal jurisdiction raised significantly federalism concerns. The Court
stated that "we believe that it would be as unwise as it would be unneces-
sary to lay down any sweeping pronouncement upon the existence or ex-
ercise of such jurisdiction.""
Finally, in Finley v. United States,"' the Court again rejected an as-
sertion of supplemental jurisdiction against additional non-diverse de-
294. Id. at 376.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2ooo).
296. 411 U.S. 693,716-17 (1973).
297. Id. at 713.
298. Id. at 715.
299. 427 U.S. I, 18-i9 (1976).
300. Id. at i8.
301. 490 U.S. 545,555-56 (1989).
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fendants in a Federal Tort Claim Act action against the United States,
even though the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the FTCA
claims and the entire action therefore could be litigated only in federal
court. The Court ruled that Congress had not authorized the exercise of
such pendent party jurisdiction, which involved a significant expansion of
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Once again, therefore, the Court
had no occasion to address the limits that Article III might place on the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in cases where it has been author-
ized by Congress." 2
Of course, the I99o supplemental jurisdiction statute resolved the is-
sue of statutory authority raised by Finley by expressly authorizing fed-
eral courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims "that are
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article IIIl33-
subject to exceptions designed at least partially to preserve the complete
diversity requirement that the drafters of the Multiparty, Multiforum Act
and the proposed class action jurisdiction legislation now propose to
eliminate. 4 However, it would be mistaken to assume that the enact-
ment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute resolves more than the is-
sue of statutory authorization or answers the questions about the
constitutional scope of pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction that the
Supreme Court refused to decide in the decisions reviewed above. Spe-
cifically, nothing in the supplemental jurisdiction statute resolves when
non-diverse state law claims are "so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or contro-
versy under Article 11I. "35 And although it may be tempting to assume
that the required relationship is that prescribed by Gibbs in the pendent
party as well as pendent claim contexts, that assumption is unjustified.
Courts applying the Gibbs doctrine have tended to equate that deci-
sion's "common nucleus of operative fact" standard for pendent claim
jurisdiction with the transactionally based standard for joinder of parties
302. The Court simply assumed, without deciding, that had Congress authorized the exercise of
such jurisdiction, it would have been constitutional. Id. at 549. The Court noted, however, that unlike
cases of ancillary jurisdiction in which an additional party has a claim on assets within the court's con-
trol, "we have never reached such a result [involving claims against an additional party] solely on the
basis that the Gibbs test has been met." Id. at 551.
303. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2ooo).
304. Id. § 1367(b). As it turned out, drafting oversights and errors have created ongoing contro-
versy about the extent to which the "exceptions" have in fact preserved the complete diversity re-




and claims that pervades the FRCP.3 6 As it has evolved from the tight
factual relationship among claims between two parties involved in Gibbs
to the looser concept of a single "transaction" or "series" of transactions
or occurrences uniting claims between different parties under the FRCP,
however, the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine has lost touch with its
origins. That evolution has been entirely understandable. Courts have
undoubtedly tended to equate the Gibbs "common nucleus" standard
with the loose transactional standard of the FRCP because of the diffi-
culty of establishing any clear line of demarcation between the two. More
fundamentally, however, Gibbs's references to the efficiency-based justi-
fication for pendent claim jurisdiction3" play naturally into the efficiency
orientation of the transactionally based joinder provisions of the FRCP.
The clearest expression of this principle lies in the ALI's complex litiga-
tion proposal, which invoked just that justification for its proposed
enlargement of federal jurisdiction to encompass not only claims be-
tween non-diverse parties asserted within a single diversity action, but
also state court proceedings in which no diversity of citizenship existed at
all, provided those proceedings arose out of the same transaction or oc-
currence as apending federal proceeding and involved a common ques-
tion of fact.3 That development rests on a fallacious premise. The
transactionally based joinder provisions of the federal rules-particularly
as very liberally interpreted by the federal courts3 -are designed to
achieve judicial and litigant economy within a single system of courts.
They have no express or implicit relationship to the limits of Article III.
Contrary to the presuppositions of the enacted and pending federal
jurisdiction revision proposals, efficiency-based considerations alone do
306. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 13(g) (authorizing joinder of cross claims between co-parties that
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original action); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (authoriz-
ing a plaintiff to assert a claim against a third party defendant that arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence as plaintiff's original claim against the defendant); FED. R. CIV. P. 2o(a) (authorizing the
joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant in the original complaint where the claims by or against them
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or "series" of transactions or occurrences and involve a
common question of law or fact). See also supra note 284.
307. In its discussion of judicial discretion to exercise or decline pendent claim jurisdiction where
the power to do so exists the Court observed
[t]hat power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consis-
tently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's
right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over
state claims ....
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
3o8. See supra text accompanying notes 32-56.
309. Under the prevailing view, claims satisfy the "same transaction" standard if they are "logically
related" to each other in a way that will achieve some judicial economy, even if they involve significant
legal and factual differences. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1t6 § 3523, at 94-96.
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not provide an adequate basis for the assertion of federal jurisdiction
over claims that do not satisfy the requirements of Article III.3"' The sup-
positions of the Framers were the opposite, as evidenced by the early en-
actment of the Anti-Injunction Act prohibiting federal court injunctions
against state judicial proceedings regardless of whether they involved
duplicative relitigation of facts and issues pending in a parallel federal
case."' In interpreting the Act in its current form, Justice Black pointed
out that "from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially
separate legal systems. Each system proceeds independently of the other
with ultimate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either
system. Understandably this dual court system was bound to lead to con-
flicts and frictions. 3.. This expectation and tolerance of overlapping and
duplicative federal/state litigation involving the same subject matter was
not simply a matter of statutory policy, but "rests on the fundamental
constitutional independence of the States and their courts. ... 33
The proper guide to the joinder of jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional parties and claims in a federal court is whether the asser-
tion of such jurisdiction is "necessary and proper" to permit the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction assigned to them by the Constitution.
Just as the Anti-Injunction Act recognizes that a federal court may en-
join state court proceedings whenever that is "necessary in aid of its ju-
risdiction" or to "protect or effectuate its judgments, '314 so a federal
court must have the power-if authorized by Congress3 '5-to entertain or
remove from state court non-jurisdictional claims where that is necessary
to permit the court to render an effective judgment or prevent its judg-
ments from prejudicing, legally or practically, the rights of non-parties or
of those before the court.' Even an appropriately demanding necessary
and proper standard of review in this context so vital to the federal state
310. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 (1984); Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (s9o9); John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 129, 154 (1987); Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Fed-
eral Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HAS-INGS CONST. L.Q.
643, 66o (1985) ("No matter how great the efficiency justification for pendent jurisdiction, it cannot be
allowed if not authorized by the Constitution and the [jurisdictional] statute.").
311. The Anti-Injunction Act was first enacted on March 2, 1793, and provided, "nor shall a writ of
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state." Act of March 2, 1973, ch. 22, § 5,
i Stat. 335 (1793).
312. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (i97o).
313. Id. at 287.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Act also authorizes federal court injunctions of state judicial proceed-
ings where "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." That exception cannot be taken to expand fed-
eral judicial power beyond injunctions that are necessary to its exercise under the necessary and
proper analysis discussed in the text.
315. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28,32 (2002).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100, 264-68.
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balance317 would not impose any standard of strict "necessity" on Con-
gress, or make efficiency considerations irrelevant to the scope of federal
judicial power. Those considerations would be relevant, however, only
insofar as they bore on the ability of parties possessing claims falling
within the scope of Article III to invoke federal court jurisdiction, or of
the federal courts effectively to exercise jurisdiction over such claims. It
is one thing to authorize the consolidation in federal court of claims
where that is necessary to permit the court fairly and efficiently to re-
solve a federal question or diversity claim properly before it. It is quite
another to authorize a federal court to entertain non-diverse state law
claims because of the perceived inadequacies and inefficiencies of state
courts. The first objective falls well within a necessary and proper im-
plementation of Article III. The second does not.
2. The Validity of Current and Proposed Exercises of
Supplemental Jurisdiction Under a Necessary and Proper
Model of Federal Jurisdiction
The joinder of non-diverse state law claims with diversity claims un-
der the current joinder provisions of the federal rules, provided they
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the jurisdictional
claims with which they are joined, is consistent with a necessary and
proper model of federal jurisdiction. By contrast, many of the provisions
of the enacted and proposed federal jurisdiction expansion legislation are
inconsistent with necessary and proper limits on federal court jurisdic-
tion.
The current enactments and proposals for federal jurisdiction expan-
sion are based on general notions of the inadequacy of justice rendered
by state courts, and of the need to achieve judicial economy in multiple
cases involving similar claims arising out of transactionally related cir-
cumstances.' 8 No logical or dependent relationship of the kind involved
in historic equitable joinder practice or under Rules 14, I9, or 24 is re-
quired.3 9 In this setting, the permissibility of exercising supplemental ju-
risdiction over non-diverse claims by or against parties permissively
joined under Rule 20, or asserted in the context of a class action under
Rule 23(b)(3), arguably provide more pertinent analogies.
Rule 20 authorizes the joinder of claims by or against multiple plain-
tiffs or defendants where those claims arise out of "the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
317. See supra text accompanying notes 156-64.
318. See supra Part I.
319. See FED. R. Crv. P. 14 (governing impleader); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (governing necessary and in-
dispensable parties); FED. R. Crv. P. 24 (governing intervention). See also supra note 117.
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law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.""32 In the di-
versity context, the supplemental jurisdiction statute expressly excludes
the joinder of claims against non-diverse defendants under Rule 20 sup-
plemental to the exercise of jurisdiction over a transactionally related
claim against a diverse defendant,32 ' but omits mention of claims joined
by both diverse and non-diverse plaintiffs against a single defendant hav-
ing the required transactional relationship.3"' This omission -apparently
the result of a drafting oversight3"3 -has led to an unresolved conflict of
authority in the courts of appeals over whether the statute authorizes the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims asserted by non-diverse
plaintiffs in cases in which some plaintiffs are of diverse citizenship from
the defendant.3 4 Although substantial arguments exist on both sides of
this issue, the assumption of all of the opinions addressing the question
to date is that the question is purely a matter of statutory interpretation
and raises no question of constitutional dimension.
Is this assumption-that Congress may abrogate the complete diver-
sity requirement in the context of Rule 20 permissive joinder based on a
simple transactional relationship among claims-justified? Such a con-
clusion would find little support in the historic model, which based equi-
table joinder of claims on a joint, logical, or dependent relationships
among them.325 For the reasons already discussed, however, the necessary
and proper model of federal jurisdiction does provide significant support
for the idea that claims voluntarily joined by diverse and non-diverse
plaintiffs against a single defendant, or by a single plaintiff against both
diverse and non-diverse defendants, arising out of the same or a series of
related transactions and occurrences, should fall within the supplemental
jurisdiction of the federal courts to avoid deterring the use of the federal
forum by the intended beneficiaries of the Diversity Clause.326 No similar
"deterrence" rationale supports many of the more expansive provisions
of the enacted and proposed federal jurisdiction legislation. This particu-
320. FED. R. CIv. P. 2o(a).
321. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000) (excluding from supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases
claims "by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule... 20").
322. See § 1367(b).
323. See Rowe, supra note 54, at 961 n.9t; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (i91); Pfander, supra note 54, at 145 n.132.
324. See, e.g., Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d IIO, 122 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding supplemental
jurisdiction in class action context); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., I6o F.3d 631, 640-41 (ioth Cir. 1998)
(rejecting supplemental jurisdiction over diversity claim failing to satisfy jurisdictional amount);
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F-3d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding contra
to Leonhardt); Free v. Abbott Labs. (In re Abbott Labs.), 5I F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding sup-
plemental jurisdiction in class action context). See also Pfander, supra note 54, at 154-6o.
325. See supra text accompanying notes i i4-3o.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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larly is true of those relating to the removal of class actions involving di-
verse claims from state to federal court by in-state defendants or plain-
tiffs, the removal of actions based on the citizenship of purported class
members or represented parties that have not been certified as class ac-
tions, and the removal of stand-alone state court actions involving no di-
versity of citizenship at all.3"
Class actions maintained under Rule 23 where not all named repre-
sentatives or members of the class are diverse from the defendants pre-
sent more difficulty of analysis and offer a superficial analogy to the
pending class action jurisdiction legislation. Under traditional analysis,
only the named class representatives need be of diverse citizenship from
the defendants.328 The citizenship of the members of the class is disre-
garded for the purpose of determining whether the "complete diversity"
requirement is satisfied.329 To the extent the class judgment is binding on
the members of the class, the court's jurisdiction to affect their rights is
viewed as "ancillary" to that over the claims of the named representa-
tives.33 ° In the leading decision, Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,33'
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the binding effect of a judgment in a
federal court class action commenced by members of an Indiana frater-
nal benefits association who were of diverse citizenship from the defen-
dant, seeking injunctive relief against a planned reorganization of the
association, upon the rights of class members who were citizens of Indi-
ana. The Court stated that the district court had jurisdiction "ancillary"
to that over the claims of the diverse class representatives to determine
the rights of the non-diverse members of the class. In sustaining the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction, the court followed an historic model similar to
that suggested above:
It is true that jurisdiction, not warranted by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, cannot be conferred by a rule of court, but class
suits were known before the adoption of our judicial system, and were
in use in English chancery....
... Owing to the number of interested parties and the impossibility
of bringing them all before the court, the original suit was peculiarly
one which could only be prosecuted by a part of those interested in su-
ing for all in a representative suit. Diversity of citizenship gave the Dis-
trict Court jurisdiction. Indiana citizens were of the class represented;
their rights were duly represented by those before the court. The inter-
327. See supra text accompanying notes 242-46, 211-41, 261-63.
328. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1921); 7A WRiHT ET AL.,
supra note I16, § 1755.
329. Id.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 331-32.
331. 255 U.S. 356, 366-67. See also Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885).
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vention of the Indiana citizens in the suit would not have defeated the
jurisdiction already acquired. Being thus represented, we think it must
necessarily follow that their rights were concluded by the original de-
cree.
33'
Several aspects of Ben Hur suggest that it should not be read as a
categorical endorsement of federal jurisdiction based on the "minimal
diversity" of a single class member from one defendant as proposed by
the class action jurisdiction legislation. First, as the quoted language sug-
gests, the Court followed the long-standing view that the true "parties"
before the court for the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship
were the named class representatives, not the members of the class them-
selves, who were concluded, not because they were parties themselves,
but because they were represented by those who were.333 Even today,
considerable authority supports the view that unnamed class members
are not full parties to the action before the court, although their rights
may be concluded by the decree.334 Second, Ben Hur was not concerned
with the typical "common question" class action that is the subject of the
proposed class action legislation, but rather with an historically recog-
nized "true" class action which sought to enjoin the disposition of funds
of an association in which the absent class members were alleged to pos-
sess a joint interest.335
More generally, Ben Hur was a case of the kind described in Rule
23(b)(I) governing modern class action practice in the federal courts.
That subdivision authorizes class action certification where the due-
332. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 366 (internal citations omitted).
333. See HOPKINS, supra note 1I6, at 239-40 (Equity Rule 38, 1912) ("When the question is one of
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracti-
cable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.").
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and can not, without manifest incon-
venience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discre-
tion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having
sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interest of the plaintiffs and defen-
dants in the suit properly before it.
Id. at 104-o 5 (Equity Rule 48, promulgated Mar. 2, 1842).
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest incon-
venience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion
may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient
parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in
the suit properly before it.
Id. at 52 (Equity Rule 48, 1822).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 202-1O.
335. 255 U.S. at 361. As the Court observed in Ben-Hur
The subject-matter included the control and disposition of the funds of a beneficial organi-
zation and was properly cognizable in a court of equity. The parties bringing the suit truly
represented the interested class. If the decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments




process based commonality, typicality and adequate representation re-
quirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and where the prosecution of
separate actions by or against individual class members would risk estab-
lishing inconsistent standards of conduct with respect to the members of
the class or would, as a practical matter, impair their ability to protect
their rights.336 That category of class actions has direct antecedents in
class action practice in the courts of equity at the time the Constitution
was adopted.337 It also has strong ties to the joinder provisions of Rules i9
and 24, which find support in a necessary and proper model of federal ju-
risdiction by permitting the joinder in a single action of both jurisdic-
tional and non-jurisdictional claims where that is necessary to permit the
court to accord complete relief or to avoid prejudice to the rights of ei-
ther absentees or the parties before the court resulting from the court's
decree."' s
The class action provision most relevant in the present context, how-
ever, is Rule 23(b)(3), which authorizes a federal class action to be main-
tained whenever the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and the
court finds that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy." '339 As the advisory commit-
tee notes to the 1966 amendments of Rule 23, which introduced this pro-
vision, recognize, the Rule 23(b)(3) "common question" class action had
no clear lineage, either in English equity practice34 or in pre-1966 class
336. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(I).
337. See supra text accompanying notes i I9-3o.
338. For a discussion of historic equitable class action practice, see supra text accompanying notes
1 15-3o. The Advisory Committee for the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 specifically tied the provisions
of Rule 23(b)(i) to the corresponding provisions of Rules 19 and 24. See FED. R. Clv. P. 23 advisory
committee notes (1966).
In the same way, maintenance of class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) on the ground that the party
opposing the class has taken actions "generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole," even
absent complete diversity of citizenship between all class members and the defendants, also derives
support from the necessary and proper model of federal judicial jurisdiction. In such a situation, the
court's decree either will, as a practical matter, be applied equally to all members of the class-as, for
example, in a civil rights action seeking injunctive relief against racial discrimination in the hiring or
education of members of the plaintiff class-or, if it is not, will create clear inequities among similarly
situated members of the class. Congress and the rules drafters acted well within the boundaries of a
necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction in promulgating Rule 23 (b)(2) to prevent such im-
pairment of the rights of absent parties or inequities among the members of the class as a result of a
federal court decree. In many of its applications, moreover, Rule 23 (b)(2) is simply a specific example
of the class actions covered by Rule 23(b)(I), and thus has strong historic antecedents as well.
339. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
340. See supra text accompanying notes i I9-3o.
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action practice in the federal courts.3 4' Rather, such actions, to the extent
they previously were permitted at all, were viewed as "spurious" class ac-
tions that would not conclude the members of the "class" unless they
chose to intervene in the action as parties following the rendition of a fi-
nal decree. 4 Moreover, unlike the other provisions of Rule 23, which
were designed to prevent practical prejudice and unfairness to either ex-
isting parties or the absentees as a result of the court's decree, and drew
upon historic practice in that respect, Rule 23(b)(3) was acknowledged to
be an innovation in which
class action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those [cases] de-
scribed above, but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable de-
pending upon the particular facts. Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses
those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results.' 4
Under a "necessary and proper" model of federal jurisdiction, the
primary emphasis of the rule on achieving judicial economy by resolution
of such transactionally related claims on a class-wide basis provides weak
support for an expansion of federal jurisdiction.44 Viewed in another
light, however, Rule 23(b)(3) could be characterized as nothing more
than a permissive joinder device. Because of its requirement that all class
member be accorded individual notice of the pendency of the action and
an opportunity to opt out,345 class members have the opportunity to de-
cline to participate if they wish. Viewed in this way, the considerations
supporting the permissive joinder provisions of Rule 20 for claims arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence under a necessary and proper
model of federal jurisdiction -particularly the consideration that plain-
tiffs possessing claims independently falling within the subject matter ju-
risdiction of the federal court may be deterred from enforcing their rights
in that forum if they are not able to join their claims with those of other,
similarly situated litigants346 - would apply equally to the permissive join-
der authorization of Rule 23(b)(3). In fact, a strong undercurrent of the
341. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note on subdivision (b)(3)(1966).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344- See supra text accompanying notes 3o8-13.
345. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(c)(2).
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the mem-
bers of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall ad-
vise each class member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the
member so requests by a specified date ....
Id.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59, 326.
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1966 amendments adding Rule 23(b)(3) was the concern that absent such
an authorization, claims independently falling within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal court might prove to small to be viable in indi-
vidual actions.347 Even assuming that absent class members were, con-
trary to settled historic practice,"4' regarded as "parties" for the purpose
of determining diversity of citizenship, such an argument for entertaining
their claims ancillary to the claims of diverse parties properly before the
court would satisfy the requirements of a necessary and proper model of
the federal diversity jurisdiction. But the expansive removal provisions of
the proposed class action jurisdiction legislation cannot similarly be sup-
ported. Those provisions do not provide a device for voluntary joinder of
multiple claims arising out of the same transaction in federal court, thus
removing an impediment to the invocation of the diversity jurisdiction by
its intended beneficiaries. Rather, in many of their applications, they
provide a mechanism for in-state citizen defendants to defeat the plain-
tiffs' chosen state forum. Similarly, the Multiparty, Multiforum Act's
provision for removal of stand-alone state court actions in which no
plaintiff asserts a claim falling within the federal diversity jurisdiction
draws no support from such a necessary and proper "deterrence" ration-
ale.
CONCLUSION
Whether viewed in terms of "minimal diversity" or of "supplemental
jurisdiction," the test for joining diversity or other claims falling within
the scope of Article III with state law claims that do not should be the
same. Where Congress undertakes to assign to the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over non-diverse state law claims asserted or consolidated in an ac-
tion together with claims falling within the scope of Article III, those
non-jurisdictional claims should be held to fall within the scope of the
federal judicial power only if it is "necessary and proper" for the federal
courts to entertain them to achieve the purposes of the constitutional
grant.
Because a vital aspect of the balance between federal and state judi-
cial power established by the Constitution is at stake, such a necessary
and proper analysis should focus on real, rather than imagined, congres-
347. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note on subdivision (b)(3).
The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for
denial of a class action. On the other hand, these interests may be theoretic rather than
practical; the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the action
through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for indi-
viduals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable.
Id.
348. See supra notes 203-04, 328.
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sional reasons, and should require a discernable connection between le-
gitimate Article III ends and the specific expansions of federal jurisdic-
tion at issue. Viewed in this light, neither the formal presence of
"minimal diversity" somewhere in an aggregated group of claims, nor the
formal presence of some sort of "transactional relationship" among
them, should in itself suffice to sustain the assertion of federal jurisdic-
tion over non-diverse state law claims without further consideration of
the context in which their joinder arose and the purposes that it serves.
In this respect, all of the federal jurisdiction expansion enactments and
proposals are deficient, because they proceed on the assumption that
finding such a "minimal diversity" or transactional "hook" to a jurisdic-
tional claim satisfies the requirements of Article III without further in-
quiry. That assumption, based on extensions of Tashire and Gibbs to
entirely new contexts which they neither considered or resolved, should
be rejected.
Adoption of a necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction
would not unduly confine Congress or the rules drafters in shaping an
enlightened system for joinder of parties and claims. Considerations of
judicial economy are not irrelevant to an appropriate necessary and
proper analysis. To the extent that they bear an achieving the purposes
of the Diversity Clause, as they frequently may do, Congress or the rules
drafters may take them into account. If the diseconomy of separately liti-
gating jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims might bear significantly
on the willingness and ability of the intended beneficiaries of the Diver-
sity Clause to invoke the protection of the federal court, rules of party
and claim joinder properly may eliminate those obstacles to the invoca-
tion of a federal forum. Many provisions of the current federal rules,
such as Rule 20's provision for joinder of multiple plaintiffs and defen-
dants in a single complaint based on a transactional relationship among
claims, may be supported on that ground.
Moreover, significant aspects of the jurisdiction expansion enact-
ments and proposals, such as permitting the assertion of original jurisdic-
tion, or the removal by a non-citizen defendant, of an entire action where
only some claims in the action are between parties of diverse citizenship,
satisfy the requirements of such a necessary and proper analysis. Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss is not cast in constitutional stone. Congress rationally
could conclude that an out-of-state citizen in a state court action that also
involves non-diverse claims would suffer prejudice if forced to litigate in
the courts of the state, and rationally could provide for the removal of
the entire action in order to preserve, to the extent possible, the plain-
tiff's joinder choices. Similarly, Congress could seek to facilitate access to
federal court by the intended beneficiaries of the Diversity Clause by
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providing that a party possessing a diversity claim might join non-diverse
claims by or against other plaintiffs or defendants arising out of the same
transaction in the same federal action.
In other important respects, however, the enacted and proposed ju-
risdiction expansion legislation raises significant questions, both of valid-
ity and policy. To the extent they baldly are predicated on the need to
achieve judicial and litigant economy and consistent outcomes between
federal and state litigation arising from the same events or transactions,
the proposals on their face seek to achieve ends that are unrelated to the
purpose of the Diversity Clause. This is most apparent with respect to
the removal provisions of the ALI's complex litigation proposal and the
Multiparty, Multiforum Act, which explicitly are based on judicial econ-
omy considerations, and which would permit removal of state law actions
in which no diversity of citizenship at all is present merely because they
possess a "transactional relationship" with a pending federal action.
The proposed class action fairness legislation stands perhaps on
firmer ground, particularly in its proposal for removal of state court class
actions by a member of the plaintiff's class where a substantial number of
the members of the class are of diverse citizenship from any defendant.
Perhaps in that circumstance, at least where the diverse class members
are not citizens of the state from which removal is sought, Congress
might rationally conclude that out-of-state class members would be
prejudiced by being forced to litigate in a defendant's home court-if
one puts aside the fact that the named class representative has chosen to
litigate in the courts of that state on behalf of the class. Similarly, an out-
of-state defendant in such a class action who is of diverse citizenship
from some class representatives or class members would be entitled to
the protections accorded by the Diversity Clause.
But in other important applications, the class action fairness pro-
posal fails to satisfy the requirement for a discernable tie between the
purposes of Article III and its expansive jurisdictional provisions. This
surely is true of the provision for removal by any in-state citizen defen-
dant, or any in-state citizen class member, of an entire class action in
which there is any diversity of citizenship between any class member and
any defendant-even taking account of the currently proposed restric-
tion preventing removal where two thirds of the class members and the
primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action originally
was filed. Even more obviously, significant concerns are presented by the
provisions for removal of an action which has not been certified as a class
action, or which is not a class action at all, provided that some members
of the proposed class or some non-parties on whose "behalf" the suit is
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brought, may be of diverse citizenship from any defendant-without re-
gard to the citizenship of the removing defendant.
Perhaps Congress and other proponents of the current proposals for
federal jurisdiction expansion on the basis of "minimal diversity" could
provide satisfactory answers to the questions raised in this article regard-
ing these and other questionable aspects the proposals when viewed in
terms of the purposes of the Diversity Clause. They have not done so be-
cause of the erroneous assumption that a minimal diversity "hook" is all
that is required to permit the aggregation of non-diverse state law claims
in federal court to achieve unrelated ends. More should be required be-
fore the vast expansion of federal court jurisdiction that these proposals
seek to accomplish is determined to be "necessary and proper" to
achieve the purposes of Article III.
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